AI agent vulnerability · n8n

GHSA-38c7-23hj-2wgq: n8n has Webhook Forgery on Zendesk Trigger Node

mediumCVSS 4.0 6.3 · 3.1 4.0

Impact An attacker who knows the webhook URL of a workflow using the ZendeskTrigger node could send unsigned POST requests and trigger the workflow with arbitrary data. The node does not verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature that Zendesk attaches to every outbound webhook, allowing any party to inject crafted payloads into the connected workflow. Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.6.2 and 1.123.18.

Published Feb 26, 2026

Affected packages

n8n

Ecosystem: npm
Affected: < 1.123.18
Fixed in: 1.123.18
Check: npm ls n8n

n8n

Ecosystem: npm
Affected: >= 2.0.0, < 2.6.2
Fixed in: 2.6.2
Check: npm ls n8n

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Impact

An attacker who knows the webhook URL of a workflow using the ZendeskTrigger node could send unsigned POST requests and trigger the workflow with arbitrary data. The node does not verify the HMAC-SHA256 signature that Zendesk attaches to every outbound webhook, allowing any party to inject crafted payloads into the connected workflow.

Patches

The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 2.6.2 and 1.123.18. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability.

Workarounds

If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:

Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only.
Restrict network access to the n8n webhook endpoint to known Zendesk IP ranges.

These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Credited to nkoorty, jjjutla.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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