GHSA-3h2q-j2v4-6w5r: OpenClaw's system.run allowlist approval parsing missed PowerShell encoded-command wrappers
OpenClaw 2026.3.2 and earlier did not treat PowerShell -EncodedCommand as an inline-command wrapper in system.run. In allowlist mode, a caller could run a PowerShell payload with pwsh or powershell using -EncodedCommand, -enc or -e and skip the approval step that -Command requires. Fixed in OpenClaw 2026.3.7.
Published Mar 9, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026
What an attacker can do
OpenClaw's system.run checks shell wrappers to find the real command being run. Its PowerShell flag set held only -c, -command and --command. When a request used -EncodedCommand, -enc or -e, the wrapper was not recognized, and the request fell back to plain argv analysis. The argv looked like a call to an allowlisted-looking executable, so the payload inside the base64 string never reached the approval path that an equivalent -Command call would.
The result is an allowlist bypass. A caller with access to system.run, including an agent steered by a prompt injection, could run arbitrary PowerShell on the host without the operator approving it. Because the payload is base64, the approval prompt would also have shown nothing readable.
The rating is medium (5.0). The attacker needs low privileges and the attack has high complexity. The host must be using allowlist mode, and the host must have PowerShell installed.
Who is affected
The npm package openclaw, versions <= 2026.3.2. Only deployments that use system.run in allowlist mode are exposed. Hosts without pwsh or powershell on the path are much less at risk. Check the version:
npm ls -g openclaw
openclaw --versionopenclaw
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 2026.3.2
- Fixed in
- 2026.3.7
- Check
npm ls openclaw
How to fix it
Upgrade to openclaw 2026.3.7 or later. It was published to npm on March 8, 2026.
npm install -g [email protected]Commit 1d1757b adds -encodedcommand, -enc and -e to POWERSHELL_INLINE_COMMAND_FLAGS in src/infra/shell-inline-command.ts. Allowlist mode now asks for approval on those payloads, and approved PowerShell wrapper flows work as before. The sources give no workaround for older versions.
How to tell if you were hit
Search shell and process logs on OpenClaw hosts for pwsh or powershell started with -EncodedCommand, -enc or -e, and decode the base64 argument to see what ran. Look for system.run requests that executed without an approval record. PowerShell script block logging, if enabled, records the decoded payload. Beam logs agent shell commands, so encoded PowerShell launched by an agent would appear in its record and can be flagged by a rule.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
OpenClaw's system.run shell-wrapper detection did not recognize PowerShell -EncodedCommand forms as inline-command wrappers.
In allowlist mode, a caller with access to system.run could invoke pwsh or powershell using -EncodedCommand, -enc, or -e, and the request would fall back to plain argv analysis instead of the normal shell-wrapper approval path. This could allow a PowerShell inline payload to execute without the approval step that equivalent -Command invocations would require.
Latest published npm version: 2026.3.2
Fixed on main on March 7, 2026 in 1d1757b16f48f1a93cd16ab0ad7e2c3c63ce727d by recognizing PowerShell encoded-command aliases during shell-wrapper parsing, so allowlist mode continues to require approval for those payloads. Normal approved PowerShell wrapper flows continue to work.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected versions:
<= 2026.3.2 - Patched version:
>= 2026.3.7
Fix Commit(s)
1d1757b16f48f1a93cd16ab0ad7e2c3c63ce727d
Release Process Note
npm 2026.3.7 was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.
Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.
Credited to tdjackey.
Questions
- Is OpenClaw 2026.3.2 affected by this system.run bypass?
Yes. Versions up to and including 2026.3.2 are affected. Upgrade to 2026.3.7 or later.
- Which PowerShell flags were missed?
-EncodedCommand, -enc and -e. Before the fix only -c, -command and --command were treated as inline-command wrappers.
- Does this affect hosts not using allowlist mode?
The advisory describes the bypass in allowlist mode, where approval is normally required for wrapper payloads. It does not describe other modes.
- Does this advisory have a CVE?
No CVE id is assigned in the data we have. It is tracked as GHSA-3h2q-j2v4-6w5r.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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