GHSA-5847-rm3g-23mw: OpenClaw has hook auth rate limiter bypass via IPv4-mapped IPv6 client key variants
OpenClaw's hook authentication throttle, in versions up to 2026.2.21-2, counted failed attempts by the raw client address text. `1.2.3.4` and `::ffff:1.2.3.4` got separate buckets, so an attacker could double the brute-force budget from 20 to 40 attempts per 60 seconds. Upgrade `openclaw` to 2026.2.22.
Published Mar 3, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026
What an attacker can do
The limiter in src/gateway/auth-rate-limit.ts, used by src/gateway/server-http.ts, keyed failures by the socket's remoteAddress string. A dual-stack listener can report one IPv4 client either as 1.2.3.4 or as the IPv4-mapped form ::ffff:1.2.3.4. The limiter saw two clients. An attacker who can send from both forms splits failed hook-auth guesses across them and gets 40 attempts in each 60-second window instead of 20 (CWE-770).
This is a modest weakening, not a bypass. The limit is doubled, not removed. The attacker needs network access to the gateway's hook endpoint and must guess the hook credential. The CVSS 4.0 vector shows no privileges and no user interaction, with low availability impact only. The practical risk depends on how strong the hook token is. A long random token makes even 40 guesses a minute irrelevant. A short or reused one is easier to brute-force over time. Teams that expose the hook endpoint beyond loopback should treat the rate limit as a backstop, not the main control.
Who is affected
The openclaw npm package below 2026.2.22 (up to 2026.2.21-2), where the gateway's hook endpoint is reachable by untrusted clients. Check the version:
npm ls openclaw
openclaw --versionCheck whether the hook endpoint listens beyond loopback and whether your hook token is long and random.
openclaw
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 2026.2.22
- Fixed in
- 2026.2.22
- Check
npm ls openclaw
How to fix it
Upgrade to 2026.2.22:
npm install -g [email protected]The fix (commit 3284d2eb227e7b6536d543bcf5c3e320bc9d13c5) centralizes canonical client-IP normalization for auth rate limiting and uses that canonical key for hook auth throttling, so both address forms share one bucket. The sources name no workaround. Use a long random hook token and keep the hook endpoint off untrusted networks.
How to tell if you were hit
In gateway or reverse-proxy logs, look for repeated failed hook-auth requests from the same host that alternate between the IPv4 form and the ::ffff:-prefixed form, at more than 20 per minute combined. A burst of failures followed by a success is the worrying pattern. The sources give no fixed log string for this flaw.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Vulnerability
The hook authentication throttle keyed failed attempts by raw socket remoteAddress text.
IPv4 and IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms of the same client (for example 1.2.3.4 and ::ffff:1.2.3.4) were treated as different clients, allowing separate rate-limit buckets.
Impact
An attacker could split failed hook-auth attempts across both address forms and effectively double the brute-force budget from 20 to 40 attempts per 60-second window.
Affected Components
src/gateway/server-http.tssrc/gateway/auth-rate-limit.ts
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Vulnerable versions:
<= 2026.2.21-2 - Patched version (planned next release):
2026.2.22
Remediation
Centralize and reuse canonical client-IP normalization for auth rate-limiting, and use that canonical key for hook auth throttling.
Fix Commit(s)
3284d2eb227e7b6536d543bcf5c3e320bc9d13c5
Release Process Note
patched_versions is pre-set to the planned next release (2026.2.22) so once npm release 2026.2.22 is published, this advisory can be published directly.
OpenClaw thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.
Questions
- How much does the bug help a brute-force attack?
It doubles the budget, from 20 to 40 failed attempts per 60-second window, by splitting them between an IPv4 address and its IPv4-mapped IPv6 form.
- Which version fixes GHSA-5847-rm3g-23mw?
OpenClaw 2026.2.22. Versions up to 2026.2.21-2 are affected.
- Which components changed?
src/gateway/server-http.ts and src/gateway/auth-rate-limit.ts. They now share canonical client-IP normalization for the throttle key.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
More OpenClaw vulnerabilities
All OpenClaw entriesCVE-2026-62197
OpenClaw: Browser CDP discovery could accept blocked WebSocket URLs
medium8.5Oct 21, 2026CVE-2026-35630
OpenClaw: QQBot native approval buttons did not enforce configured approver identity
high8.0Jul 2, 2026CVE-2026-53806
OpenClaw: Combined POSIX shell options could confuse exec revalidation
high8.8Jul 2, 2026CVE-2026-53809
OpenClaw: Embedded runner policy could be confused by provider aliases
medium3.8Jul 2, 2026CVE-2026-53810
OpenClaw's marketplace runtime extension metadata could point at unscanned payloads
high8.8Jul 2, 2026CVE-2026-53811
OpenClaw: Matrix allowFrom could bind to mutable display names
high8.8Jul 2, 2026
