GHSA-7mm3-vfg8-7rg6: Babylon Finality Provider `MsgCommitPubRandList` replay attack
Summary A high vulnerability exists in the Babylon protocol's x/finality module due to a lack of domain separation in signed messages, combined with insufficient validation in the MsgCommitPubRandList handler. Specifically, the handler does not enforce that the submitted Commitment field is 32 bytes long.
Published May 15, 2025 · Updated Jul 31, 2025
Affected packages
github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.1.0
- Fixed in
- 1.1.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/babylonlabs-io/babylon
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
A high vulnerability exists in the Babylon protocol's x/finality module due to a lack of domain separation in signed messages, combined with insufficient validation in the MsgCommitPubRandList handler. Specifically, the handler does not enforce that the submitted Commitment field is 32 bytes long. This allows an attacker to replay a signature originally generated for a different message (e.g., a Proof-of-Possession in MsgCreateFinalityProvider) as a MsgCommitPubRandList. By crafting the message parameters, an attacker can use the typically 20-byte address bytes (from the PoP context) to form the StartHeight, NumPubRand, and a shorter-than-expected Commitment (e.g., 4 bytes). The replayed signature will pass verification for this crafted message, leading to the injection of an invalid PubRand commitment.
Impact
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability, specifically via the PoP signature replay, allows an attacker to store an invalid PubRand commitment (with a non-standard length, e.g., 4 bytes) for a targeted Finality Provider (FP). Despite the commitment itself being malformed, it's the associated StartHeight and NumPubRand (derived from the replayed address bytes and typically very large) that cause severe consequences
Future recommendations
To minimize future risk of such attacks, all finality providers should:
- Never re-use your finality provider EOTS across the networks (e.g., the testnet) or for any other purpose.
- Never use EOTS keys to sign any other data than relevant to in-protocol messages. Ideally EOTS key should only be used to:
- Sign initial proof of possession message
- Sign periodic randomness commits
- Sign finality votes with every block
Finder
Vulnerability discovered by:
- Marco Hextor
- https://x.com/marcohextor
- @marcohextor
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Go vulnerabilities
All Go entriesGHSA-4rmq-mc2c-r495
Babylon Incorrect FP inactive accounting in costaking creates “phantom stake” that earns rewards after BTC unbond
medium6.9No fixDec 9, 2025GHSA-m6wq-66p2-c8pc
Babylon Nil BlockHash in BLS vote extensions triggers panics in consensus handlers
high8.7No fixDec 8, 2025GHSA-56j4-446m-qrf6
Babylon vulnerable to chain half when transaction has fees different than `ubbn`
high8.7No fixJun 30, 2025GHSA-869w-47c6-fq8q
Babylon Integer Overflow in Distribution Module CumulativeRewardRatio Calculation Leading to Chain Halt
high8.2May 15, 2025
