GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr: The DES/3DES cipher was used as part of the TLS protocol by installation tools
Impact What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted? The Karmada components deployed with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476#issuecomment-694914728, the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked.
Published Jan 3, 2024
Affected packages
github.com/karmada-io/karmada
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.8.0
- Fixed in
- 1.8.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/karmada-io/karmada
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
The Karmada components deployed with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart take Golang default cipher suites as part of the TLS protocol, which includes the insecure algorithm. Referring to https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476#issuecomment-694914728, the 3DES algorithm vulnerability is very unlikely to be attacked. However, to address the concerns and to avoid being disturbed by the security scanner, Karmada has decided to limit the cipher suites to exclude the insecure 3DES algorithm and accordingly release this security advisory.
The components affected are:
- karmada-apiserver
- karmada-aggregated-apiserver
- karmada-search
- karmada-metrics-adapter
- etcd
Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_
From Karmada v1.8.0, when deploying Karmada with karmadactl, karma-operator, and helm chart, the default minimum TLS version of components(include karmada-apiserver, karmada-aggregated-apiserver, karmada-search, and karmada-metrics-adapter) would be set to TLS1.3 to get rid of the insecure algorithm, and set default cipher suites(TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305,TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305) for etcd.
Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_
By setting the --tls-min-version for the affected components to TLS 1.3, or explicitly setting the --cipher-suites to secure algorithms.
References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_
- Enhancements made from the Karmada community: https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/issues/4191
- Impact discussions from the Golang community: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476
Credited to zhzhuang-zju, yanfeng1992.
References
- https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/security/advisories/GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr
- https://github.com/golang/go/issues/41476
- https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/issues/4191
- https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/commit/98e655fc552b2987c3f2d2a061007889ce8be536
- https://github.com/karmada-io/karmada/commit/c3c376605403e07ca0ed2dc39c9e0f3c38f8e29d
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7xg2-83f8-39mr
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
