GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x: Apple App Store Server Python Library: SignedDataVerifier accepts stale OCSP GOOD responses and can bypass certificate revocation checks
Summary SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enableonlinechecks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signeddataverifier.py, ChainVerifier.checkocspstatus() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.
Published Jul 13, 2026
Affected packages
app-store-server-library
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 0.2.0, <= 3.1.1
- Fixed in
- 3.1.2
- Check
pip show app-store-server-library
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enable_online_checks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py, _ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.
As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP GOOD response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an App Store signing certificate or intermediate is ever revoked, applications using this library with online checks enabled can continue accepting JWS objects signed with the revoked key as long as a stale signed OCSP response is replayed.
Credited to 0xmrma.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
