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Open-source package vulnerability · PyPI

GHSA-8f6j-263m-g72x: Apple App Store Server Python Library: SignedDataVerifier accepts stale OCSP GOOD responses and can bypass certificate revocation checks

mediumCVSS 4.0 6.9

Summary SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enableonlinechecks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signeddataverifier.py, ChainVerifier.checkocspstatus() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.

Published Jul 13, 2026

Affected packages

app-store-server-library

Ecosystem
PyPI
Affected
>= 0.2.0, <= 3.1.1
Fixed in
3.1.2
Check
pip show app-store-server-library

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

SignedDataVerifier attempts to perform online revocation checking when enable_online_checks=True, but its OCSP validation logic accepts stale GOOD responses as valid indefinitely. In appstoreserverlibrary/signed_data_verifier.py, _ChainVerifier.check_ocsp_status() verifies the OCSP response signature and CertID match, but never validates the freshness window carried by producedAt, thisUpdate, or nextUpdate.

As a result, a previously valid signed OCSP GOOD response can be replayed after it is expired, and the library will still treat the certificate as good. If an App Store signing certificate or intermediate is ever revoked, applications using this library with online checks enabled can continue accepting JWS objects signed with the revoked key as long as a stale signed OCSP response is replayed.

Credited to 0xmrma.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology