GHSA-9j7f-3r4p-pwh6: nono-py vulnerable to authorization bypass / policy confusion
The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxyonly, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes.
Published Jun 26, 2026
Affected packages
nono-py
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 0.10.1
- Fixed in
- 0.11.0
- Check
pip show nono-py
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
The python API made a restrictive-looking configuration unsafe by default. A caller could configure only reverse- proxy credential routes, put the child in CapabilitySet.proxy_only, and reasonably expect network access to be limited to those routes. Instead, because empty allowed_hosts meant allow-all inside nono-proxy, the child could use the local proxy as a transparent CONNECT tunnel to non-route nominated hosts (not including metadata endpoints).
That is an authorization bypass / policy confusion issue:
- Intended policy: route-only proxy access.
- Actual policy: route-only plus arbitrary transparent CONNECT.
- Boundary crossed: sandboxed child gains broader outbound network reach than the Python policy appears to grant.
- Impact depends on environment, but it can allow exfiltration or access to unintended internet/internal services through the unsandboxed proxy.
This should be classified as medium severity by default, potentially high if users rely on route-only configs for strict egress control around untrusted code or sensitive credentials. The fix is security-relevant because it changes the default from implicit allow-all to explicit opt-in.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
