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Open-source package vulnerability · Composer (PHP)

GHSA-9rcc-pmj8-ffhr: Semantic MediaWiki's Special:FacetedSearch cstate hidden inputs enable reflected XSS (residual of CVE-2025-10354)

mediumCVSS 3.1 6.1

Summary Special:FacetedSearch cstate hidden inputs enable reflected XSS (residual of CVE-2025-10354) Details Affected versions and vulnerable location - Confirmed present on latest shipped release tag available in the local clone: SemanticMediaWiki/[email protected]. - Confirmed present on default branch master at HEAD 18f418b4cdf2875e67a741349179a22c1573f61c.

Published Sep 18, 2026

Affected packages

mediawiki/semantic-media-wiki

Ecosystem
Composer (PHP)
Affected
>= 4.2.0, <= 7.2.0
Fixed in
7.2.1
Check
composer show mediawiki/semantic-media-wiki

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Special:FacetedSearch cstate hidden inputs enable reflected XSS (residual of CVE-2025-10354)

Details

Affected versions and vulnerable location

  • Confirmed present on latest shipped release tag available in the local clone: SemanticMediaWiki/[email protected].
  • Confirmed present on default branch master at HEAD 18f418b4cdf2875e67a741349179a22c1573f61c.

Vulnerable sink (default-branch representation):

  • src/MediaWiki/Specials/FacetedSearch/HtmlBuilder.php:131-133
  • Builds $hidden by concatenating unescaped request-controlled cstate[$key] values into an HTML attribute context (value="...").
  • templates/FacetedSearch/search.mustache:25
  • Inserts the constructed fragment via {{{hidden}}} (no HTML escaping at this boundary).

Reachability trace (verified from source)

  1. HTTP entrypoint:
  2. GET to Special:FacetedSearch dispatches into SMW\MediaWiki\Specials\SpecialFacetedSearch::execute().
  3. Request decoding boundary:
  4. SpecialFacetedSearch::execute() constructs UrlArgs from $request->getValues() and calls ParametersProcessor::checkRequest($request).
  5. Checksum gate:
  6. ParametersProcessor::checkRequest() clears cstate only when filtered != 1 and getInt('csum', 0) != crc32(getVal('q', '')).
  7. Decoder -> HTML assembly:
  8. HtmlBuilder::buildHTML() iterates foreach ( $urlArgs->getArray( 'cstate' ) as $key => $value ) and concatenates each into $hidden without escaping.
  9. HtmlBuilder::buildHTML() passes $hidden into the template variable hidden.
  10. HTML injection sink:
  11. templates/FacetedSearch/search.mustache renders {{{hidden}}} into the <form>, so the concatenated markup is inserted as raw HTML.

PoC

Reproduction steps (source-derived)

  1. Choose a q value.
  2. Compute csum as crc32(q).
  3. Send a request that includes:
  4. q=<chosen>
  5. csum=<crc32(q)>
  6. at least one cstate[<key>]=<payload> entry

Example request shape:

/index.php/Special:FacetedSearch?q=Text&csum=<crc32(Text)>&cstate[0]=x%22%20autofocus%20onfocus%3Dalert(1)%20x%22

Impact

Attacker model

  • Any remote attacker who can send HTTP requests to Special:FacetedSearch (or the localized alias mapped to the same SpecialFacetedSearch class) can supply attacker-controlled query parameters.
  • Preconditions:
  • The attacker must make cstate survive ParametersProcessor::checkRequest(), either by setting csum to crc32(q) (when filtered != 1), or by setting filtered=1.
  • The attacker must supply cstate[<key>] values containing characters that break out of the HTML value="..." attribute context (for example an injected " to terminate the attribute value).

Severity and CVSS reasoning

Proposed severity: MEDIUM.

Proposed CVSS v3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N.

Rationale:

  • AV:N: delivered over the network via query parameters.
  • AC:L: requires only setting q, csum, and at least one cstate entry.
  • PR:N: no authentication required for the request path in this code.
  • UI:R: the victim must load the crafted URL.
  • S:C: reflected XSS executes in the wiki origin and can affect other users depending on deployment and browser behavior.

Why this is a residual of CVE-2025-10354

  • The CVE-2025-10354 hardening shipped by escaping the q parameter before emitting it into the value="{{q}}" attribute.
  • Commit 3d675ce updates only the q rendering to use htmlspecialchars( $urlArgs->get( 'q', '' ) ) and does not touch the adjacent cstate -> $hidden construction loop.
  • As a result, cstate remains an unescaped input source that flows into the same raw template injection point ({{{hidden}}}), creating a distinct reflected-XSS lane.

Output (from code inspection)

Given the payload idea where cstate[0] starts with x" ... x", HtmlBuilder.php constructs the hidden fragment by concatenation:

<input name="cstate[0]" type="hidden" value="x" autofocus onfocus=alert(1) x">

Because search.mustache injects the fragment via {{{hidden}}}, the attacker-controlled markup participates in normal HTML parsing in the response body.

Suggested fix

  • Escape both the cstate key and value when constructing $hidden.
  • Minimal code change in src/MediaWiki/Specials/FacetedSearch/HtmlBuilder.php:
foreach ( $urlArgs->getArray( 'cstate' ) as $key => $value ) {
	$safeKey = htmlspecialchars( (string)$key, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8' );
	$safeValue = htmlspecialchars( (string)$value, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8' );
	$hidden .= '<input name="cstate[' . $safeKey . ']" type="hidden" value="' . $safeValue . '">';
}

This keeps the raw {{{hidden}}} template insertion safe by ensuring the concatenated HTML fragment itself is attribute-escaped.

How I found it and a note on tooling

I anchored on the published CVE-2025-10354 patch by verifying in the checked-out repository that commit 3d675ce changes only the q rendering in HtmlBuilder.php to use htmlspecialchars.

Then I traced the reachable request path from SpecialFacetedSearch::execute() through ParametersProcessor::checkRequest() (checksum gate for whether cstate survives) into HtmlBuilder::buildHTML() where $hidden is constructed from cstate without escaping and injected into templates/FacetedSearch/search.mustache via {{{hidden}}}.

(End of file)

AI tooling

I used AI assistance for the code audit and for drafting this report. I manually verified the finding against the project's source at the location cited above before reporting it, and the severity and impact assessment are my own.

Credited to arpitjain099.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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