GHSA-g5ff-637f-6q2m: LiteLLM: internal_user_viewer arbitrary local file read via `vertex_ai_credentials`
A low-privilege LiteLLM proxy user can read any file the proxy process can read. They send a crafted `vertex_ai_credentials` value to `/utils/transform_request`, and the file contents go to a URL the attacker controls. All versions before 1.95.0 are affected. Upgrade to 1.95.0.
Published Oct 27, 2026 · Analysis Oct 27, 2026
What an attacker can do
LiteLLM's request-body safety blocklist rejects the vertex_credentials key. It missed the alias vertex_ai_credentials. The aliased value therefore reached the Vertex AI credential loader, which treats the value as a file path and reads it. The loaded content is then sent to an attacker-controlled URL (CWE-22, CWE-20).
The attacker needs only an authenticated account with the internal_user_viewer role. The advisory notes that role is obtainable through SSO login on many deployments, so the barrier is low where SSO is open to a broad domain.
The practical target is the proxy's own environment. Reading /proc/self/environ can reveal LITELLM_MASTER_KEY and the provider API keys. With the master key the attacker becomes proxy admin. Any other file the process can read, such as mounted config, service account JSON or Kubernetes tokens, is also exposed. The scope is confidentiality and integrity, with no availability impact in the CVSS vector.
Who is affected
All litellm versions below 1.95.0 are affected. The proxy server must be running, because the flaw is in the /utils/transform_request endpoint. A library-only use of LiteLLM without the proxy does not expose that endpoint.
Check the version:
pip show litellmFor container deployments, check the image tag of the proxy.
litellm
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 1.95.0
- Fixed in
- 1.95.0
- Check
pip show litellm
How to fix it
Upgrade to litellm 1.95.0 or later:
pip install --upgrade "litellm[proxy]>=1.95.0"The fix adds vertex_ai_credentials to the request-body blocklist. No configuration change is needed. The advisory says there is no reliable configuration workaround on affected versions.
If you think the endpoint was abused, rotate LITELLM_MASTER_KEY and every provider API key the proxy holds.
How to tell if you were hit
Search proxy access logs for calls to /utils/transform_request by internal_user_viewer accounts, particularly request bodies that include vertex_ai_credentials with a filesystem path such as /proc/self/environ.
Check egress logs for outbound requests from the proxy to unfamiliar hosts around those calls. Look also for admin actions taken with the master key from unexpected addresses, such as new keys, teams or model entries.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
An authenticated LiteLLM proxy user could read arbitrary local files from the proxy runtime by sending a crafted vertex_ai_credentials value to /utils/transform_request. The request-body safety blocklist rejected vertex_credentials but missed its alias vertex_ai_credentials, which let the value reach the Vertex AI credential loader and trigger a file read that is sent to an attacker-controlled URL.
Impact
A low-privilege authenticated user (only internal_user_viewer, obtainable through SSO login on many deployments) could read any file readable by the LiteLLM process. Reading files such as /proc/self/environ can disclose LITELLM_MASTER_KEY and provider API keys, so the impact can escalate to full proxy-admin control.
Remediation
Upgrade to 1.95.0 or later. The fix adds the missing alias to the request-body blocklist, so no configuration change is needed once you upgrade. There is no reliable configuration workaround on affected versions.
Credited to rekter0.
Questions
- Which LiteLLM role can exploit this file read?
internal_user_viewer, the lowest internal role. The advisory says it is obtainable through SSO login on many deployments, so no admin access is needed.- Can this lead to full proxy takeover?
Yes. Reading
/proc/self/environcan discloseLITELLM_MASTER_KEYand provider API keys, which the advisory says can escalate to full proxy-admin control.- Is there a workaround short of upgrading?
No. The advisory says there is no reliable configuration workaround on affected versions. Upgrade to 1.95.0 or later.
References
Read for this analysis:
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
Coverage on the Beam blog
More LiteLLM vulnerabilities
All LiteLLM entriesCVE-2026-114612
LiteLLM: Privilege Escalation to Proxy Admin via Cross-Domain Reuse of the Salt Key
high9.9Oct 27, 2026GHSA-hhww-mrg2-969h
LiteLLM vulnerable to reflected XSS in /sso/debug/callback
medium6.8Oct 27, 2026CVE-2026-84377
LiteLLM: Authenticated SSRF and provider-credential exfiltration via unvalidated request-body routing parameters
medium6.5Sep 30, 2026CVE-2026-59823
LiteLLM Proxy has server-side request forgery via the `user_config` request parameter
medium5.3Sep 17, 2026CVE-2026-37004
LiteLLM vulnerable to server-side template injection in the /prompts/test endpoint
critical9.8Aug 27, 2026CVE-2026-59819
LiteLLM: Local file read via request-supplied OIDC file references
low2.1Jul 22, 2026
