GHSA-g8fc-vrcg-8vjg: Constallation has pods exposed to peers in VPC
Impact Cilium allows outside actors (world entity) to directly access pods with their internal pod IP, even if they are not exposed explicitly (e.g. via LoadBalancer). A pod that does not authenticate clients and that does not exclude world traffic via network policy may leak sensitive data to an attacker inside the cloud VPC. Patches The issue has been patched in v2.16.3.
Published Apr 15, 2024 · Updated Jun 4, 2024
Affected packages
github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 2.16.3
- Fixed in
- 2.16.3
- Check
go list -m github.com/edgelesssys/constellation/v2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
Cilium allows outside actors (world entity) to directly access pods with their internal pod IP, even if they are not exposed explicitly (e.g. via LoadBalancer). A pod that does not authenticate clients and that does not exclude world traffic via network policy may leak sensitive data to an attacker _inside the cloud VPC_.
Patches
The issue has been patched in v2.16.3.
Workarounds
This network policy excludes all world traffic. It mitigates the problem, but will also block all desired external traffic. If vulnerable pods are known, a policy can be crafted to only firewall those instead (see also https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/policy/language/#access-to-from-outside-cluster).
apiVersion: "cilium.io/v2"
kind: CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: "from-world-to-role-public"
spec:
endpointSelector:
matchLabels: {}
# role: public
ingressDeny:
- fromEntities:
- worldReferences
The tracking bug for a Cilium-side fix is https://github.com/cilium/cilium/issues/25626.
Credited to brb, burgerdev.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
