GHSA-h5hg-h7rr-gpf3: OpenClaw: Node browser proxy `allowProfiles` bypass through persistent profile mutation and runtime profile selection
In OpenClaw up to 2026.3.13-1, the node browser proxy setting `nodeHost.browserProxy.allowProfiles` did not restrict which browser profiles a caller could use. A caller could create or delete persistent profiles and select other profiles at request time. Fixed in 2026.3.22.
Published Apr 3, 2026 · Updated Apr 9, 2026 · Analysis Oct 30, 2026
What an attacker can do
The node browser proxy exposes a browser to the gateway. allowProfiles is meant to limit the proxy to named profiles, so the agent can use only a throwaway profile and not one that holds logged-in sessions. The setting was documented but not fully enforced.
Two gaps allowed a bypass. First, with an allowlist set, a caller could still send POST /profiles/create or DELETE /profiles/{name}, which change the persistent profiles on the node. Second, a request could choose its profile at runtime through the profile field in the query or body, and the proxy did not check that choice against the list.
An attacker therefore reaches profiles they should not, and a browser profile can hold cookies, saved passwords and sessions for email, source hosting and cloud consoles. The attacker needs low privileges on the gateway, such as a prompt-injected agent that can call the browser proxy. The CVSS vector shows high confidentiality and integrity impact.
Who is affected
The npm package openclaw, versions 2026.3.13-1 and earlier, on nodes that run the browser proxy. The setting matters when nodeHost.browserProxy.allowProfiles is set to a non-empty list, since that is when you expected a restriction. Check the version and the configuration:
npm ls openclaw
openclaw --versionLook in your node host configuration for browserProxy.allowProfiles.
openclaw
- Ecosystem
- npm
- Affected
- <= 2026.3.13-1
- Fixed in
- 2026.3.22
- Check
npm ls openclaw
How to fix it
Upgrade to openclaw 2026.3.22 or later; v2026.3.22 is the first stable tag with the fix.
npm install -g [email protected]The fix commit enforces the list in runBrowserProxyCommand in src/node-host/invoke-browser.ts. With a non-empty allowProfiles, only listed profiles can be targeted, and profile creation and deletion through the proxy are rejected with an INVALID_REQUEST error. An empty list keeps the old behavior of exposing all profiles, so set the list explicitly. The sources list no workaround.
How to tell if you were hit
Review node host logs and browser proxy requests for POST /profiles/create and DELETE /profiles/ calls, and for requests that name a profile outside your allowlist through the query or body. List the browser profiles on the node and look for ones you did not create, or missing ones. Check what the agent browser session visited. Beam records agent MCP tool calls and shell commands, which helps show what a browser-using agent did.
Original advisory
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Node browser proxy allowProfiles bypass through persistent profile mutation and runtime profile selection
Current Maintainer Triage
- Status: open
- Normalized severity: high
- Assessment: Real released allowProfiles bypass through profile mutation and runtime profile selection, fixed and shipped in v2026.3.22+, so keep open for publish rather than close.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Latest published npm version:
2026.3.31 - Vulnerable version range:
<=2026.3.13-1 - Patched versions:
>= 2026.3.22 - First stable tag containing the fix:
v2026.3.22
Fix Commit(s)
eac93507c36ccd0c359fba18fa466ef6448be8a5— 2026-03-23T00:56:44-07:00
Release Process Note
- The fix is already present in released version
2026.3.22. - This draft looks ready for final maintainer disposition or publication, not additional code-fix work.
Thanks @smaeljaish771 for reporting.
Credited to smaeljaish771, KeenSecurityLab.
Questions
- Which OpenClaw version fixes the allowProfiles bypass?
2026.3.22. Versions up to and including 2026.3.13-1 are affected. The fix commit is eac9350.
- What does an empty allowProfiles list do after the fix?
It keeps the legacy behavior: all configured profiles are exposed, including the create and delete routes. Restrictions apply only when the list is non-empty.
- Is there a CVE?
This entry has only the GitHub advisory id GHSA-h5hg-h7rr-gpf3. No CVE id appears in the advisory data.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology
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