GHSA-hff9-5pqw-6w9f: imgproxy has integer overflow in imgproxy ICO loader that causes denial of service and may permit remote code execution
Summary The ICO loader allocates datasize + BMPFILEHEADERLEN bytes after reading a 32-bit attacker-controlled datasize. For datasize UINT32MAX - BMPFILEHEADERLEN, the addition wraps before allocation. imgproxy then writes the ICO prefix and reads up to the original declared size starting 14 bytes into the undersized allocation.
Published Oct 30, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v3
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.16
- Fixed in
- 4.0.16
- Check
go list -m github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v3
github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.16
- Fixed in
- 4.0.16
- Check
go list -m github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy/v2
github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.16
- Fixed in
- 4.0.16
- Check
go list -m github.com/imgproxy/imgproxy
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The ICO loader allocates data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN bytes after reading a 32-bit attacker-controlled data_size. For data_size > UINT32_MAX - BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN, the addition wraps before allocation. imgproxy then writes the ICO prefix and reads up to the original declared size starting 14 bytes into the undersized allocation. A network client can turn this heap overflow into remote denial of service or remote code execution.
Technical details
The vulnerable path is in `vips/icoload.c` at commit `f4fedbb`:
uint32_t data_size = GUINT32_FROM_LE(largest_image_header.data_size);
VipsPel *data = (VipsPel *) VIPS_MALLOC(NULL, data_size + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN);
void *actual_data = data + BMP_FILE_HEADER_LEN;
if (vips_foreign_load_read_full(ico->source, actual_data, data_size) <= 0) {
vips_error("vips_foreign_load_ico_header", "unable to read ICO image data from the source");
return -1;
}The crafted directory entry contains:
data_size = 0xfffffff5 (4294967285)
data_offset = 22
BMP header size = 14
32-bit result = (0xfffffff5 + 14) mod 2^32 = 3The allocation is therefore three bytes. actual_data points 14 bytes after the allocation base. The fixture contains 64 bytes after the ICO header, so the source callback copies those 64 bytes to an invalid destination before it can report that the declared multi-gigabyte payload is incomplete.
The complete source-to-sink path is:
- Attacker-controlled bytes begin with the ICO magic
00 00 01 00. - imgproxy identifies the source as ICO and dispatches it to
vips_icoload_source_go. vips_foreign_load_ico_headerreads the attacker-controlleddata_size.- The 32-bit addition wraps, and
VIPS_MALLOCreceives the value three. vips_foreign_load_read_fullpasses the originaldata_sizeto the Go source callback.- The callback writes the available source bytes through the invalid pointer, corrupting the process heap.
Impact
A crafted image can terminate the imgproxy process handling it or potentially lead to remote code execution due to heap corruption.
Credited to mateofumis, JasonPuglisi, JacobBrackett.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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