GHSA-jf2q-463c-6f52: androidqf: Zip entry Name Injection in APK bundle (Zip Slip for zip consumers)
Summary generateZipPath() constructs zip entry names for collected APKs using device controlled content from extractFileName(). Since extractFileName() does not reject traversal sequences, the resulting zip entry name can contain ../. AndroidQF itself does not extract the zip it creates, but any forensic tool that extracts the acquisition bundle without zip-slip protection could write files to attacker chosen paths.
Published May 21, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/mvt-project/androidqf
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.8.2
- Fixed in
- 1.8.3
- Check
go list -m github.com/mvt-project/androidqf
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
generateZipPath() constructs zip entry names for collected APKs using device controlled content from extractFileName(). Since extractFileName() does not reject traversal sequences, the resulting zip entry name can contain ../. AndroidQF itself does not extract the zip it creates, but any forensic tool that extracts the acquisition bundle without zip-slip protection could write files to attacker chosen paths.
Impact
A compromised device could inject path traversal sequences into the acquisition bundle's zip entry names. When a forensic analyst or forensic tooling extracts the bundle without entry name validation, files could be written outside the intended extraction directory.
Patched version
Credits
This issue was identified during a security assessment conducted by 0xche.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
