GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr: GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)
Summary GitPython's config-name validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the "option" label; it does not reject =, #, ;, [, ], or whitespace in an option name. writesection writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so an option name such as sshCommand = touch # is written as \tsshCommand = touch # = , which git parses as core.sshCommand = touch (the trailing # comments out the intended value).
Published Aug 7, 2026
Affected packages
GitPython
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.1.57
- Fixed in
- 3.1.58
- Check
pip show GitPython
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
GitPython's config-name validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the "option" label; it does not reject =, #, ;, [, ], or whitespace in an option name. write_section writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so an option name such as sshCommand = touch <cmd> # is written as \tsshCommand = touch <cmd> # = <value>, which git parses as core.sshCommand = touch <cmd> (the trailing # comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand, core.hooksPath, alias.*) → RCE on the next git operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not section name) and distinct character class (=/#/space, not newline/bracket) from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67 (newline injection).
Root Cause
_assure_config_name_safe(name, label) (git/config.py:897) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY when label == "section"; for the "option" label it falls through with just the UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\r\n\x00] regex. write_section then writes the option name verbatim into "\t%s = %s\n" (config.py:702).
Impact
Arbitrary git-config directive injection → remote code execution via core.sshCommand (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed) or core.hooksPath (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.
Proof of Concept
with repo.config_writer() as cw:
cw.set_value("core", "sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #", "x")
# git config --get core.sshCommand -> touch /tmp/RCEAttack Chain
- Entry: app calls config writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name:
set_value("core", "sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #", "x"). - Check:
_assure_config_name_safe(option, "option")@ config.py. Guard: regex matches only[\r\n\x00]; bracket/quote state machine is gated onlabel=="section". Bypass proof:=,#,space pass → noValueError. - Sink:
write_sectionwrites"\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\n"(config.py:702). - Impact: git parses
core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE→ arbitrary code execution on next git op.
Bypass Evidence
Independently reproduced (gate harness): set_value('core','sshCommand = touch <RCE> #','x') → no ValueError; file line sshCommand = touch <RCE> # = x; git config --get core.sshCommand → touch <RCE> (rc=0). Also verified core.hooksPath via both GitConfigParser and repo.config_writer(). Fix-commit read: bracket/quote checks are inside if label == "section"; the "option" label is not covered.
Affected Versions
GitPython <= 3.1.57 (validator present verbatim on the latest release tag).
Suggested Fix
Apply the section-name safety checks (reject =, #, ;, [, ], whitespace) to the "option" label as well, or validate the fully-rendered config line after substitution.
--- Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
Credited to manus-use.
References
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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