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AI agent vulnerability · OpenClaw

GHSA-pjvx-rx66-r3fg: OpenClaw: Cross-account sender authorization expansion in `/allowlist ... --store` account scoping

mediumCVSS 3.1 5.4

Summary /allowlist ... --store resolved the selected channel accountId for reads, but store writes still dropped that accountId and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store. Because default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the default account.

Published Mar 9, 2026

Affected packages

openclaw

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 2026.3.2
Fixed in
2026.3.7
Check
npm ls openclaw

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

/allowlist ... --store resolved the selected channel accountId for reads, but store writes still dropped that accountId and wrote into the legacy unscoped pairing allowlist store.

Because default-account reads still merge legacy unscoped entries, a store entry intended for one account could silently authorize the same sender on the default account.

This is a real cross-account sender-authorization scoping bug. Severity is set to medium because exploitation requires an already-authorized user who can run /allowlist edits.

Affected Packages / Versions

  • Package: openclaw (npm)
  • Latest published version checked: 2026.3.2
  • Affected versions: <= 2026.3.2
  • Fixed on main: March 7, 2026 in 70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73
  • Patched release: 2026.3.7

Details

The affected path was:

  • src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:386-393 resolved accountId and read store state with it
  • src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:697-702 and src/auto-reply/reply/commands-allowlist.ts:730-733 wrote store state without passing accountId
  • src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:231-234 and src/pairing/pairing-store.ts:534-554 still merged legacy unscoped allowlist entries into the default account

The fix scopes /allowlist ... --store writes to the resolved account and clears legacy default-account store entries on removal so legacy reads no longer create cross-account authorization bleed-through.

Impact

  • Vulnerability class: improper authorization scoping / incorrect authorization
  • Exploitation requires: an already-authorized sender who can run /allowlist edits
  • Security effect: unintended authorization expansion from one channel account into default

Fix Commit(s)

  • 70da80bcb5574a10925469048d2ebb2abf882e73 — scope /allowlist ... --store writes by account and clean up legacy default-account removals

Release Process Note

npm 2026.3.7 was published on March 8, 2026. This advisory is fixed in the released package.

Thanks @tdjackey for reporting.

Credited to tdjackey.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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