GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf: `potato-annotation` has a Project-Boundary Bypass
Summary validatepathsecurity uses string-prefix containment (startswith) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are outside the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., /tmp/potatoprojdemoevil/... vs /tmp/potatoprojdemo) to be accepted.
Published May 8, 2026
Affected packages
potato-annotation
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 2.0.0, < 2.4.5
- Fixed in
- 2.4.5
- Check
pip show potato-annotation
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
validate_path_security uses string-prefix containment (startswith) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are outside the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... vs /tmp/potato_proj_demo) to be accepted.
Details
Affected source location (root cause)
File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py
Snippet (lines 370–373):
real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_base):
raise ConfigSecurityError(...)Snippet (lines 384–389):
real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
check_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir
real_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir):
raise ConfigSecurityError(...)startswith() is string-based, so /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... passes when checked against /tmp/potato_proj_demo.
Confirmed affected call sites
File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py
validate_file_pathstask_dir branch (line 2113)
validated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir)validate_file_pathsdata_files branch (line 2151)
validated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir)validate_training_configtraining.data_file branch (line 2286)
validated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir)PoC
from potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security
base = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo'
vuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt'
try:
print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base))
except Exception as e:
print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e)
try:
validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base)
except Exception as e:
print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e)
print('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base))Impact
- Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary.
- Can affect read paths (
data_files,training.data_file,base_css,header_logo) and output/path placement depending on configuration.
Credited to QiaoNPC.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
