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AI agent vulnerability · OpenClaw

GHSA-r7vr-gr74-94p8: OpenClaw: Command-authorized non-owners could reach owner-only `/config` and `/debug` surfaces

highCVSS 3.1 8.8

OpenClaw documents the `/config` and `/debug` commands as owner-only, but their handlers checked only that the sender was command-authorized. Any lower-trust sender allowed to run commands could read or change privileged configuration. The npm package `openclaw` is affected up to 2026.3.11 and fixed in 2026.3.12.

Published Mar 13, 2026 · Analysis Oct 31, 2026

What an attacker can do

OpenClaw separates senders who may run chat commands from owners who control the deployment. The /config and /debug surfaces belong to the second group. The handlers did not make that distinction. They asked whether the sender was authorized to run commands, and a yes was enough (CWE-285, improper authorization).

The attacker needs to be a sender the deployment already trusts with ordinary commands, such as a member of a shared channel or an allowed chat user. No user interaction is needed, and the vector is network, low complexity, low privileges.

From there a non-owner can read configuration that may include tokens, channel settings and policy, and can change it. The advisory rates confidentiality, integrity and availability impact as high. Changing configuration can loosen tool policy or redirect integrations, so the effect can grow beyond the one command.

Teams that open OpenClaw commands to groups beyond the owner are the ones that should act first.

Who is affected

openclaw up to and including 2026.3.11. The practical exposure is any deployment where non-owner senders are command-authorized. Check:

npm ls openclaw

openclaw

Ecosystem
npm
Affected
<= 2026.3.11
Fixed in
2026.3.12
Check
npm ls openclaw

How to fix it

Upgrade to 2026.3.12 or later.

npm install -g [email protected]

Owner checks are now enforced on the privileged command surfaces, and regression tests cover access control for /config and /debug. The advisory describes no mitigation besides the upgrade.

How to tell if you were hit

Search command logs for /config and /debug invoked by senders who are not owners. Review the configuration for changes you did not make, and rotate any secrets a non-owner could have read. Beam records agent shell commands and MCP tool calls, which helps you check what an agent did after a configuration change.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

OpenClaw documented /config and /debug as owner-only commands, but the command handlers checked only whether the sender was command-authorized. A lower-trust sender who was intentionally allowed to run commands could still reach privileged configuration and debugging surfaces.

Impact

This allowed a non-owner sender to read or change privileged configuration that should have remained restricted to owners.

Affected versions

openclaw <= 2026.3.11

Patch

Fixed in openclaw 2026.3.12. Owner checks are now enforced for privileged command surfaces, and regression tests cover /config and /debug access control.

Credited to tdjackey.

Questions

Who can exploit this?

A sender who is command-authorized but not an owner. The flaw is that /config and /debug checked only command authorization.

Does it require user interaction?

No. The CVSS vector is network, low complexity, low privileges and no user interaction.

Which version fixes it?

openclaw 2026.3.12. Version 2026.3.11 and earlier are affected.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

More OpenClaw vulnerabilities

All OpenClaw entries