GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3: GitPython: Unsafe git option guard bypass via single-character kwarg value token smuggling enables arbitrary command execution
Summary GitPython's checkunsafeoptions guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for every guarded method (clone/clonefrom, fetch/pull/push, lsremote, itercommits, blame, archive) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg.
Published Jul 24, 2026
Affected packages
GitPython
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- <= 3.1.53
- Fixed in
- 3.1.54
- Check
pip show GitPython
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
GitPython's check_unsafe_options guard (the control introduced by CVE-2026-42215 / GHSA-2f96 and hardened since) can be bypassed for every guarded method (clone/clone_from, fetch/pull/push, ls_remote, iter_commits, blame, archive) by smuggling an option token inside the VALUE of a single-character kwarg. In the default allow_unsafe_options=False configuration this yields arbitrary command execution via --upload-pack.
Root Cause
The guard builds its candidate option list from kwarg KEYS only: _option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=<cmd>"}) returns ['-n'] (cmd.py:1042-1046 derives the candidate from the key, never the value). -n is not on the denylist, so check_unsafe_options passes. But transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True) (cmd.py:1600-1606) emits two argv tokens ['-n', '--upload-pack=<cmd>']. git then parses the second token as --upload-pack and executes the attacker-supplied command. The guard never inspects the value that becomes a separate argv token.
Impact
Arbitrary OS command execution as the host process (via --upload-pack) in the default configuration, affecting all guarded methods since they all build candidates through the name-only _option_candidates.
Proof of Concept
from git import Repo
Repo.clone_from(bare_repo, out_dir, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack")
# /tmp/ACE created -> ACE. Direct-name form upload_pack="..." is correctly BLOCKED.File-write variant on a guarded revision command: iter_commits('HEAD', g='--output=/path') -> candidate ['-g'] passes, argv ['-g','--output=/path'], victim file truncated.
Attack Chain
- Entry: app forwards a user-supplied options dict ->
Repo.clone_from(url, path, n="--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack"). Guard:check_unsafe_options(options=_option_candidates([], kwargs), unsafe=unsafe_git_clone_options)at base.py. Bypass proof:_option_candidates([], {"n":"--upload-pack=..."})->['-n'](key-only), not on denylist -> no UnsafeOptionError (verified live). - Transform:
transform_kwarg('n', value, split_single_char_options=True)->['-n', '--upload-pack=touch /tmp/ACE;git-upload-pack']. Guard: none (guard already passed on name-only candidate). Bypass proof: verified transform emits two tokens. - Sink:
git clone -n --upload-pack='touch ...;git-upload-pack' -- <src> <dst>; git parses and runs the second token. Impact: ACE (marker created, verified end-to-end).
Bypass Evidence
Live-verified on HEAD (tag 3.1.53): _option_candidates returns key-only candidate ['-n']; transform_kwargs emits the smuggled --upload-pack= token; clone_from with the payload created the marker file; the direct-name upload_pack= form raised UnsafeOptionError. All prior bypasses (GHSA-rpm5 underscore key, GHSA-2f96 long-option abbreviation, GHSA-v396 joined short option, GHSA-x2qx multi-before-split) are BLOCKED on HEAD — this is a distinct kwarg-value->separate-token vector.
Affected Versions
<= 3.1.53
Suggested Fix
Make _option_candidates also emit candidates derived from single-character kwarg VALUES when split_single_char_options is in effect, OR run check_unsafe_options over the fully-transformed argv rather than the reconstructed name-only candidate list.
--- Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
Credited to manus-use.
References
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2180
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/e8d0fbf774d1f6baa3b481adfe48bd262e43b453
- https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.54
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r9mr-m37c-5fr3
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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