GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp: chi's RealIP Middleware allows IP spoofing via unvalidated X-Forwarded-For header
Summary realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls Details the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP() function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces r.RemoteAddr without checking if the request came from a trusted proxy no trusted proxy cidr check in place, any client can…
Published Jun 25, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.5.5
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/go-chi/chi/middleware
github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.1.1
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/go-chi/chi/v2/middleware
github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 3.3.5
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/go-chi/chi/v3/middleware
github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 4.1.3
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/go-chi/chi/v4/middleware
github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 5.3.0
- Fixed in
- 5.3.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls
Details
the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP() function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces r.RemoteAddr without checking if the request came from a trusted proxy
func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
var ip string
if tcip := r.Header.Get(trueClientIP); tcip != "" {
ip = tcip // controlled by attacker
} else if xrip := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); xrip != "" {
ip = xrip // controlled by attacker
} else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",") // controlled by attacker
}
// ...
return ip
}no trusted proxy cidr check in place, any client can send these headers
PoC
create a server with chi and use realip middleware
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Use(middleware.RealIP)
r.Get("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// ip-based access control got bypassed
if r.RemoteAddr == "127.0.0.1" {
w.Write([]byte("SECRET ADMIN DATA"))
return
}
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", 403)
})
http.ListenAndServe(":8080", r)
}spoofed the ip to bypass access control
curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1" http://localhost:8080/adminImpact
- ip-based access control bypass lets attackers reach restricted endpoints
- rate limiting bypass lets attackers avoid limits by rotating spoofed ips
- audit logs show fake ips picked by attacker instead of real ones
- attackers can get around geo ip restrictions
Remediation Recommendation
validate proxy cidr first before trusting forwarded ip headers
// add your reverse proxy ip addresses here
var trustedProxies = []net.IPNet{
{IP: net.ParseIP("10.0.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(8, 32)},
{IP: net.ParseIP("172.16.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(12, 32)},
{IP: net.ParseIP("192.168.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(16, 32)},
}
func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, cidr := range trustedProxies {
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}Credited to rezmoss.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
