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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

GHSA-vqv5-385r-2hf8: Contrast's unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation

highCVSS 3.1 7.1

Impact Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker.

Published Feb 5, 2025 · Updated Feb 6, 2025

Affected packages

github.com/edgelesssys/contrast

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 1.4.0
Fixed in
1.4.1
Check
go list -m github.com/edgelesssys/contrast

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Impact

Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker.

If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either

  • they set a new manifest and don't compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of the contrast CLI) or
  • they verify the coordinator and don't compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference.

Under these circumstances, the attacker can:

  • Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator's root CA.
  • Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack.

This issue does not affect the following:

  • secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA)
  • integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator
  • certificates chaining back to the mesh CA

Patches

This issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1.

Workarounds

The issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations.

  • At the first set call, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator.
  • After subsequent set or verify calls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.

Credited to 3u13r, burgerdev, katexochen.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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