GHSA-vx2m-jpxr-xv7w: Cloudreve has Broken Access Control - Revoked Share Access Still Allows Signed File URL Generation via Cached context_hint
Summary Cloudreve's file-listing responses hand the client a contexthint (UUID) that is meant to speed up follow-up operations. When that hint is replayed on the file/url (and file/thumb) routes, DBFS caches a shareNavigatorState containing the already-loaded share root and share row. On a later request carrying the same hint, shareNavigator.RestoreState repopulates shareRoot, and shareNavigator.To then skips Root.
Published Aug 24, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 4.0.0-20260606032813-26b6b1044b02
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/cloudreve/Cloudreve/v4
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Cloudreve's file-listing responses hand the client a context_hint (UUID) that is meant to speed up follow-up operations. When that hint is replayed on the file/url (and file/thumb) routes, DBFS caches a shareNavigatorState containing the already-loaded share root and share row.
On a later request carrying the same hint, shareNavigator.RestoreState repopulates shareRoot, and shareNavigator.To then skips `Root`. Root is the only place that re-checks inventory.IsValidShare (share expiry, remaining-download count, owner status, source-file validity) and the share password. As a result, a recipient who prewarms a context hint while access is valid can keep minting signed file URLs for already-known shared file paths for up to the context-hint TTL (5 * 60 = 300 s) after the owner deletes the share or the share expires — plus the lifetime of any signed entity URL minted in that window.
This is a revocation / expiry bypass, not a way to discover unknown share contents: the attacker must already have had access to the share and must know the target file URI from a prior listing.
Root cause (verified at 26b6b10)
1. List responses leak the hint and each file URI — service/explorer/response.go populates ListResponse.ContextHint and FileResponse.Path (f.Uri(false).String()).
2. `file/url` and `file/thumb` accept the client-supplied hint — routers/router.go:631 and :662:
file.POST("url", middleware.ContextHint(), /* ... */ controllers.FileURL)
file.GET("thumb", middleware.ContextHint(), /* ... */ controllers.Thumb)The file group's only auth gate is middleware.RequiredScopes(types.ScopeFilesRead) — there is no independent share-validation middleware on this route. All share validation lives inside DBFS.
3. The middleware trusts the header verbatim — middleware/file.go:41:
func ContextHint() gin.HandlerFunc {
return func(c *gin.Context) {
if c.GetHeader(dbfs.ContextHintHeader) != "" { // X-Cr-Context-Hint
util.WithValue(c, dbfs.ContextHintCtxKey{}, uuid.FromStringOrNil(c.GetHeader(dbfs.ContextHintHeader)))
}
c.Next()
}
}4. DBFS restores cached navigator state on a hint hit — dbfs.go:745 (ContextHintTTL = 5 * 60, dbfs.go:34). On a miss it arms PersistState; the closure fires in DBFS.Recycle() at end of request.
5. Persisted share state carries the loaded `shareRoot` + `share` row — share_navigator.go:72/:85. RestoreState reinstates n.shareRoot, n.share, n.owner, etc.
6. `Root` is the sole validity/password gate — share_navigator.go:114 → inventory.IsValidShare(share) (inventory/share.go:227: IsShareExpired checks Expires.Before(now) and RemainDownloads <= 0, plus owner-active and source-file checks) followed by the share.Password comparison.
7. `To` skips `Root` once `shareRoot` is set — share_navigator.go:181:
func (n *shareNavigator) To(ctx context.Context, path *fs.URI) (*File, error) {
if n.shareRoot == nil { // restored state => NOT nil => Root() skipped
root, err := n.Root(ctx, path)
...
}
...
}The single-file-share branch is also affected: it calls latestSharedSingleFile, which fetches n.fileClient.GetByID(n.share.Edges.File.ID) straight from the restored share with no revalidation (share_navigator.go).
8. A failed download hook does not block URL issuance — pkg/filemanager/manager/entity.go:250:
if err := m.fs.ExecuteNavigatorHooks(ctx, fs.HookTypeBeforeDownload, file); err != nil {
m.l.Warning("Failed to execute navigator hooks: %s", err) // logged, NOT fatal
}The share's BeforeDownload hook is shareClient.Downloaded() (UpdateOneID(share.ID).AddDownloads(1).AddRemainDownloads(-1)). Against a deleted share this update errors, but the error is only logged and the signed URL is still minted. The signed content endpoint file/content/:id/... is then guarded only by middleware.SignRequired — it does not re-check the share.
Steps to reproduce
Setup: one share owner; one recipient (a second free account, or anonymous if the default anon group keeps share-download). Recipient knows the share URL (and password, if any).
- Recipient lists the valid share: ``
GET /api/v4/file?uri=<share-uri> HTTP/1.1 Host: target`Response includescontext_hintand each file'spath`. - While the share is still valid, recipient warms the cache for a known file: ``` POST /api/v4/file/url HTTP/1.1 Host: target X-Cr-Context-Hint: Content-Type: application/json
{"uri":[""]}
(cache MISS → `Root` runs → `PersistState` armed → `Recycle` writes `shareNavigatorState` to KV under `navigator_state_<hint>_share`.)
3. Owner deletes the share, **or** it expires / hits zero remaining downloads.
4. Within 300 s, recipient repeats the **same** request from step 2 (same `X-Cr-Context-Hint`, same URI).
(cache HIT → `RestoreState` sets `shareRoot` → `To` skips `Root` → `IsValidShare` never runs → signed entity URL returned.)
5. The signed URL serves the file content; `file/content/:id/...` validates only the signature.
**Expected:** step 4 returns `ErrShareNotFound` / `ErrShareLinkExpired`.
**Actual:** step 4 returns a signed, downloadable URL.
## Impact
A former share recipient (including an anonymous one, under default permissions) can keep minting signed download URLs for already-known shared files for up to 300 s after the owner deletes the share or after time/download-limit expiry, plus the validity window of each signed URL minted in that period. It defeats owner revocation, time expiry, and the remaining-download limit, and bypasses password revalidation on cached state.
## Remediation
- On `RestoreState`, re-run `inventory.IsValidShare` and re-compare the current `share.Password` before trusting cached `shareRoot`; or bind the cached state to an authorization version that changes on any share edit/delete/download-limit change.
- Do not store authorization-sensitive share state in context-hint cache; treat the hint as a pagination/perf token only.
- Invalidate `navigator_state_*` entries when a share is edited or deleted.
- Treat `HookTypeBeforeDownload` failures as blocking for share-backed downloads.
- Add a regression test: list + prewarm hint, delete share, then `file/url` with the same hint must fail.Credited to riodrwn.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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