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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

GHSA-w2ch-4xgr-22ww: Vikunja: Task relation deletion does not check read access to the other task, allowing cross-project relation removal

lowCVSS 4.0 2.3

Summary Deleting a task relation only requires write access on the base task. Unlike relation creation, it does not verify that the caller can read the other task. A user with write access to one project can therefore delete relations whose other end lives in a project they have no access to. Since the delete removes both the forward and inverse rows, the relation also disappears for the other project's members.

Published Oct 9, 2026

Affected packages

code.vikunja.io/api

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 0.9, <= 2.5.0
Fixed in
2.6.0
Check
go list -m code.vikunja.io/api

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Deleting a task relation only requires write access on the base task. Unlike relation creation, it does not verify that the caller can read the other task. A user with write access to one project can therefore delete relations whose other end lives in a project they have no access to. Since the delete removes both the forward and inverse rows, the relation also disappears for the other project's members.

Details

TaskRelation.CanCreate (pkg/models/task_relation_permissions.go:32-52) requires write access on TaskID and read access on OtherTaskID.

TaskRelation.CanDelete (pkg/models/task_relation_permissions.go:25-29) only checks Task{ID: rel.TaskID}.CanUpdate(s, a); OtherTaskID is never authorized.

TaskRelation.Delete (pkg/models/task_relation.go:314-354) then deletes both the (task_id, other_task_id, kind) row and its inverse, so the relation is removed from the far task as well.

Affects DELETE /api/v1/tasks/{id}/relations/{kind}/{otherTaskId} and the equivalent v2 endpoint.

Impact

Low, integrity only. An authenticated user holding write permission on a shared project can remove task relations that link into projects they cannot read. No data is disclosed and no privilege is gained; the attacker cannot recreate the relation. The far project's owner sees the relation vanish without indication of who removed it.

Preconditions: the attacker has write access to a project containing a task that is already related to a task in a project they cannot access.

Proof of Concept

  1. As owner, create project P_near with task near and project P_far with task far.
  2. Share P_near with attacker at write permission (permission: 1). Do not share P_far.
  3. As owner: PUT /api/v1/tasks/{near}/relations with {"other_task_id": far, "relation_kind": "related"} -> 200.
  4. As attacker: GET /api/v1/tasks/{far} -> 403 (confirms no access).
  5. As attacker: PUT /api/v1/tasks/{near}/relations with the same body -> 403 (create path is enforced).
  6. As attacker: DELETE /api/v1/tasks/{near}/relations/related/{far} -> 200 "Successfully deleted."
  7. As owner: GET /api/v1/tasks/{far} -> related_tasks is now empty.

Reproduced against vikunja/vikunja:2.5.0.

Recommended Fix

Make CanDelete mirror CanCreate: after checking CanUpdate on the base task, also require CanRead on OtherTaskID.

Credited to JellowBeanz26.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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