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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

GHSA-ww5p-j6cj-6mqq: Nezha Dashboard: DDNS and Notification credential exposure via unredacted list API

mediumCVSS 4.0 5.5

Summary The GET /api/v1/ddns and GET /api/v1/notification endpoints return full resource objects including plaintext third-party API credentials — Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram webhook URLs with embedded bot tokens, and Authorization header values — without any field-level redaction.

Published Jun 26, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/nezhahq/nezha

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 2.2.5
Fixed in
2.2.5
Check
go list -m github.com/nezhahq/nezha

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

The GET /api/v1/ddns and GET /api/v1/notification endpoints return full resource objects including plaintext third-party API credentials — Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram webhook URLs with embedded bot tokens, and Authorization header values — without any field-level redaction. Any authenticated admin who calls these endpoints receives every stored credential in the system in a single API response. A compromised admin session or leaked PAT with nezha:ddns:read or nezha:notification:read scope exposes all third-party integration secrets.

Details

The listDDNS and listNotification handlers follow an identical pattern: they call the corresponding singleton GetSortedList(), copier.Copy the full in-memory structs into a response slice, and return them via listHandler with zero field stripping.

DDNS — `cmd/dashboard/controller/ddns.go:25–33`:

func listDDNS(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.DDNSProfile, error) {
    var ddnsProfiles []*model.DDNSProfile
    list := singleton.DDNSShared.GetSortedList()
    if err := copier.Copy(&ddnsProfiles, &list); err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    return ddnsProfiles, nil
}

The DDNSProfile struct (model/ddns.go:20–36) serializes AccessSecret with json:"access_secret,omitempty" — non-empty Cloudflare tokens and TencentCloud SecretKeys are returned in cleartext. The WebhookURL and WebhookHeaders fields may also contain embedded secrets.

Notification — `cmd/dashboard/controller/notification.go:25–33`:

func listNotification(c *gin.Context) ([]*model.Notification, error) {
    slist := singleton.NotificationShared.GetSortedList()
    var notifications []*model.Notification
    if err := copier.Copy(&notifications, &slist); err != nil {
        return nil, err
    }
    return notifications, nil
}

The Notification struct (model/notification.go:34–44) serializes URL, RequestHeader, and RequestBody — all of which commonly contain embedded bot tokens (Slack, Discord, Telegram), API keys in Authorization headers, and webhook secrets.

Route and authorization (`cmd/dashboard/controller/controller.go:155, 171`):

auth.GET("/notification", restScopeMiddleware(model.ScopeNotificationRead), listHandler(listNotification))
auth.GET("/ddns", restScopeMiddleware(model.ScopeDDNSRead), listHandler(listDDNS))

Both routes are behind authMw (JWT or PAT) and the corresponding read scope. The listHandler → filter chain uses HasPermission (model/common.go:63–82) which grants admins access to ALL profiles and restricts members to their own. No separate response struct or field masking exists anywhere in the codebase — confirmed by exhaustive search for DDNSResponse, DDNSView, NotificationResponse, NotificationView, or any JSON middleware that strips sensitive fields.

The codebase already demonstrates awareness of this pattern: serverConfigSensitiveScope() in cmd/dashboard/controller/api_token_scope.go:117 was introduced to restrict client_secret exposure via GET /server/config/:id, tightening the scope from ScopeServerRead to ScopeServerWrite. No equivalent protection exists for the DDNS or Notification list endpoints.

Tested at commit `3d74cd94` (master, post v2.2.3). The vulnerable pattern has existed since the DDNS and notification list endpoints were introduced.

PoC

  1. Deploy nezha with at least one admin user. Configure a DDNS profile with a Cloudflare API token (AccessSecret) and a Notification webhook pointing to a Slack incoming webhook URL (https://hooks.slack.com/services/T.../B.../xxx...).
  1. Authenticate as the admin user. Call:
   # DDNS credentials exposed
   curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_jwt>" \
     https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/ddns \
     | jq '.data[].access_secret'

   # Notification webhook secrets exposed
   curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <admin_jwt>" \
     https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/notification \
     | jq '.data[].url'
  1. Observe the full Cloudflare API token, Slack webhook URL with embedded token, and any RequestHeader values (e.g., Authorization: Bearer ...) returned in cleartext.
  1. Alternatively, create a PAT with nezha:ddns:read scope:
   curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer nzp_<pat_secret>" \
     https://dashboard.example.com/api/v1/ddns \
     | jq '.data[].access_secret'

If the PAT creator is an admin, all DDNS secrets are returned in a single response.

  1. Negative control: A member (non-admin) calling the same endpoints only sees their own profiles due to the HasPermission filter (model/common.go:63–82). However, an admin sees ALL profiles with ALL secrets. The security boundary crossed is the credential confidentiality boundary — a read-only listing endpoint should not return write-capable credentials.

Impact

An attacker who compromises an admin session or obtains a PAT with the appropriate read scope can exfiltrate all third-party API credentials stored in the dashboard — Cloudflare API tokens, TencentCloud SecretKeys, Slack/Discord/Telegram bot tokens, and any secrets embedded in webhook URLs or Authorization headers. These credentials can then be used to:

  • Modify DNS records for any domain managed via Cloudflare/TencentCloud DDNS profiles
  • Send messages as the Slack/Discord/Telegram bot to any configured channel
  • Access any other API the compromised credentials grant access to

The attack requires high privileges (admin JWT or PAT with appropriate scope), but the impact is amplified because a single API call exposes ALL stored credentials across ALL DDNS profiles and ALL notification webhooks, with no field-level access control separating metadata from secrets.

Suggested remediation: Introduce separate response structs (e.g., DDNSProfileResponse, NotificationResponse) that omit sensitive fields (AccessSecret, WebhookHeaders, URL, RequestHeader) from list/read endpoints, or use json:"-" tags on sensitive fields and provide them only through a dedicated credential-retrieval endpoint with stricter authorization (analogous to the existing serverConfigSensitiveScope() pattern).

Credited to sondt99.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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