CVE-2025-59420: Authlib: JWS/JWT accepts unknown crit headers (RFC violation → possible authz bypass)
Summary Authlib’s JWS verification accepts tokens that declare unknown critical header parameters (crit), violating RFC 7515 “must‑understand” semantics. An attacker can craft a signed token with a critical header (for example, bork or cnf) that strict verifiers reject but Authlib accepts. In mixed‑language fleets, this enables split‑brain verification and can lead to policy bypass, replay, or privilege escalation.
Published Sep 22, 2025 · Updated Nov 3, 2025
Affected packages
authlib
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 1.6.4
- Fixed in
- 1.6.4
- Check
pip show authlib
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Authlib’s JWS verification accepts tokens that declare unknown critical header parameters (crit), violating RFC 7515 “must‑understand” semantics. An attacker can craft a signed token with a critical header (for example, bork or cnf) that strict verifiers reject but Authlib accepts. In mixed‑language fleets, this enables split‑brain verification and can lead to policy bypass, replay, or privilege escalation.
Affected Component and Versions
- Library: Authlib (JWS verification)
- API:
authlib.jose.JsonWebSignature.deserialize_compact(...) - Version tested: 1.6.3
- Configuration: Default; no allowlist or special handling for
crit
Details
RFC 7515 (JWS) §4.1.11 defines crit as a “must‑understand” list: recipients MUST understand and enforce every header parameter listed in crit, otherwise they MUST reject the token. Security‑sensitive semantics such as token binding (e.g., cnf from RFC 7800) are often conveyed via crit.
Observed behavior with Authlib 1.6.3:
- When a compact JWS contains a protected header with
crit: ["cnf"]and acnfobject, orcrit: ["bork"]with an unknown parameter, Authlib verifies the signature and returns the payload without rejecting the token or enforcing semantics of the critical parameter. - By contrast, Java Nimbus JOSE+JWT (9.37.x) and Node
josev5 both reject such tokens by default whencritlists unknown names.
Impact in heterogeneous fleets:
- A strict ingress/gateway (Nimbus/Node) rejects a token, but a lenient Python microservice (Authlib) accepts the same token. This split‑brain acceptance bypasses intended security policies and can enable replay or privilege escalation if
critcarries binding or policy information.
Proof of Concept (PoC)
This repository provides a multi‑runtime PoC demonstrating the issue across Python (Authlib), Node (jose v5), and Java (Nimbus).
Prerequisites
- Python 3.8+
- Node.js 18+
- Java 11+ with Maven
Setup
Enter the directory authlib-crit-bypass-poc & run following commands.
make setup
make tokensTokens minted
tokens/unknown_crit.jwtwith protected header:{ "alg": "HS256", "crit": ["bork"], "bork": "x" }tokens/cnf_header.jwtwith protected header:{ "alg": "HS256", "crit": ["cnf"], "cnf": {"jkt": "thumb-42"} }
Reproduction
Run the cross‑runtime demo:
make demoExpected output for each token (strict verifiers reject; Authlib accepts):
For tokens/unknown_crit.jwt:
Strict(Nimbus): REJECTED (unknown critical header: bork)
Strict(Node jose): REJECTED (unrecognized crit)
Lenient(Authlib): ACCEPTED -> payload={'sub': '123', 'role': 'user'}For tokens/cnf_header.jwt:
Strict(Nimbus): REJECTED (unknown critical header: cnf)
Strict(Node jose): REJECTED (unrecognized crit)
Lenient(Authlib): ACCEPTED -> payload={'sub': '123', 'role': 'user'}Environment notes:
- Authlib version used:
1.6.3(from PyPI) - Node
joseversion:^5 - Nimbus JOSE+JWT version:
9.37.x - HS256 secret is 32 bytes to satisfy strict verifiers:
0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
Impact
- Class: Violation of JWS
crit“must‑understand” semantics; specification non‑compliance leading to authentication/authorization policy bypass. - Who is impacted: Any service that relies on
critto carry mandatory security semantics (e.g., token binding viacnf) or operates in a heterogeneous fleet with strict verifiers elsewhere. - Consequences: Split‑brain acceptance (gateway rejects while a backend accepts), replay, or privilege escalation if critical semantics are ignored.
References
- RFC 7515: JSON Web Signature (JWS), §4.1.11
crit - RFC 7800: Proof‑of‑Possession Key Semantics for JWTs (
cnf)
Credited to AL-Cybision.
References
- https://github.com/authlib/authlib/security/advisories/GHSA-9ggr-2464-2j32
- https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/6b1813e4392eb7c168c276099ff7783b176479df
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59420
- https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00032.html
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9ggr-2464-2j32
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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