CVE-2026-48818: Starlette: SSRF and NTLM credential theft via UNC paths in StaticFiles on Windows
Summary When serving static files on Windows, StaticFiles resolves the requested path with os.path.realpath. If a UNC path (such as \\attacker.com\share) reaches the resolver, realpath causes the process to open a connection to the remote host over SMB (port 445).
Published Jun 15, 2026
Affected packages
starlette
- Ecosystem
- PyPI
- Affected
- < 1.1.0
- Fixed in
- 1.1.0
- Check
pip show starlette
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
When serving static files on Windows, StaticFiles resolves the requested path with `os.path.realpath`. If a UNC path (such as \\attacker.com\share) reaches the resolver, realpath causes the process to open a connection to the remote host over SMB (port 445). This is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) that leaks the service account's NTLMv2 credentials to the attacker-controlled host, which can then be cracked offline or relayed to other hosts.
Details
StaticFiles.lookup_path() joins the requested path onto the served directory and calls `os.path.realpath` on the result before checking containment with `os.path.commonpath`. On Windows, a UNC path is absolute, so `os.path.join` discards the served directory and realpath resolves the bare UNC path, triggering the outbound SMB connection and NTLM authentication before the containment check rejects the path. The HTTP response is a benign 404, but the credential disclosure has already happened. POSIX systems are not affected.
This only affects the default configuration (follow_symlink=False), which uses `os.path.realpath`. The follow_symlink=True branch uses `os.path.abspath`, which performs no I/O.
Impact
Applications running on Windows that serve files with StaticFiles (directly, or via a framework built on Starlette such as FastAPI) in the default configuration are affected. StaticFiles is typically unauthenticated, so any client can trigger the SMB connection and leak the service account's NTLMv2 hash. A secondary impact is discovering internal hosts reachable over SMB by timing responses for valid versus invalid addresses.
Mitigation
Applications not running on Windows are not affected. On Windows, serving static files through a dedicated web server (such as nginx or IIS) instead of StaticFiles avoids the issue. Blocking outbound SMB (port 445) from the application host prevents the credential disclosure even if a UNC path is resolved.
Credited to nvn1729.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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