CVE-2026-126074: Active Storage: Possible DoS vulnerability in Active Storage filename handling
Impact ActiveStorage::Filename#base and #extensionwithdelimiter, and therefore #extension, pass the stored filename unmodified to File.basename and File.extname, which raise ArgumentError when the name contains a NUL byte.
Published Nov 10, 2026
Affected packages
activestorage
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- >= 8.1.0.beta1, < 8.1.4.1
- Fixed in
- 8.1.4.1
- Check
bundle info activestorage
activestorage
- Ecosystem
- RubyGems
- Affected
- < 8.0.5.2
- Fixed in
- 8.0.5.2
- Check
bundle info activestorage
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Impact
ActiveStorage::Filename#base and #extension_with_delimiter, and therefore #extension, pass the stored filename unmodified to File.basename and File.extname, which raise ArgumentError when the name contains a NUL byte. Active Storage stores the client-supplied filename verbatim, so a user who is permitted to upload an attachment could persist such a filename on databases that accept NUL bytes in string columns, such as SQLite and MySQL/MariaDB. Each subsequent request that builds a variant or preview of the blob, opens it, or renders it as an Action Text attachment then raises, possibly resulting in a persistent DoS vulnerability for the pages that display the blob until it is purged or its filename is corrected. Applications that use PostgreSQL are not affected, because PostgreSQL rejects the row.
Details
Filename#base and #extension_with_delimiter now derive from Filename#sanitized, the form that Filename#to_s and the Content-Disposition header already use. For a filename that #sanitized changes, such as one containing a NUL byte, an invalid byte sequence, a path separator or another replaced character, the base and extension now agree with #to_s; the variant format inferred from such a name may change, and an existing variant may be regenerated once. Stored filenames are not modified, and no data migration is required.
Releases
The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.
Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:
- 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/60f22af88b71eae251f112d8c0237a08a8832692.patch
- 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/9b0d4bef2211a2c08cab2e0ea17fa1d0efd5d47a.patch
Credit
This issue was found by the Anthropic OSS Scanner (ANT-2026-UQM5Z4YL).
References
- https://github.com/rails/rails/security/advisories/GHSA-p2pm-g2h6-7j5j
- https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/60f22af88b71eae251f112d8c0237a08a8832692
- https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/9b0d4bef2211a2c08cab2e0ea17fa1d0efd5d47a
- https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.0.5.2
- https://github.com/rails/rails/releases/tag/v8.1.4.1
- https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/activestorage/GHSA-p2pm-g2h6-7j5j.yml
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p2pm-g2h6-7j5j
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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