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Open-source package vulnerability · RubyGems

CVE-2026-122006: Active Storage: Possible arbitrary file write and read in image analysis

criticalCVSS 3.0 9.8GHSA-f3w6-w445-fwh9

Rails Active Storage lets an unauthenticated uploader write arbitrary files on the server, and read arbitrary files when the Disk service is used, if the app processes images with ImageMagick. Upgrade activestorage to 8.0.5.2 or 8.1.4.1. Files an attacker can read include `secret_key_base` and credentials.

Published Nov 12, 2026 · Analysis Nov 13, 2026

What an attacker can do

ImageMagick picks a coder from the content of the file it receives. Some coders act on other files named inside the image. Active Storage constrained none of them, and its ImageMagick analyzer runs at attach time. Attaching a crafted upload is enough. No variant, preview or analyze call is needed.

The attacker needs only an upload form that the app exposes to untrusted users. They can write files on the server. With Disk storage they can also read any file the app process can read. That usually includes secret_key_base, the master key and config/credentials.yml.enc contents, and third-party tokens. Those secrets can lead to remote code execution or movement into other systems. The reporter described one attack chain, and the Rails team says there may be others.

The fix ships an ImageMagick security policy. It denies the MSL scripting coder, coders that read or delete other files or fetch references, every Ghostscript-backed coder with the gs delegate, and @filename indirection. The Debian and Ubuntu default policies do not block these coders.

The EPSS score is 0.0074, and no source reports exploitation.

Who is affected

An app is affected only if it meets all three conditions:

  • It uses ImageMagick for Active Storage, meaning config.active_storage.variant_processor = :mini_magick. This is the default for apps on load_defaults 6.1 or earlier.
  • ImageMagick runs under a policy that does not deny the coders involved.
  • It accepts uploads from untrusted users.

Vulnerable gem versions: activestorage before 8.0.5.2, and 8.1.0.beta1 up to before 8.1.4.1. Check:

bundle list | grep -E "activestorage|mini_magick"

activestorage

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
>= 8.1.0.beta1, < 8.1.4.1
Fixed in
8.1.4.1
Check
bundle info activestorage

activestorage

Ecosystem
RubyGems
Affected
< 8.0.5.2
Fixed in
8.0.5.2
Check
bundle info activestorage

How to fix it

Upgrade activestorage to 8.0.5.2 or 8.1.4.1:

bundle update activestorage

If the processor is :mini_magick, you need mini_magick 5.1 or later. With an older one the app raises an exception at boot. Apps that render PostScript or PDF through ImageMagick must re-allow the gs delegate and needed coders in the host policy. Apps that replace MiniMagick.cli_env, clear the environment with MiniMagick.cli_prefix, or install their own MiniMagick::Shell do not get the shipped policy.

Workaround: copy the rules from activestorage/lib/active_storage/image_magick/policy.xml into the system policy, for example /etc/ImageMagick-7/policy.xml. At minimum deny the MSL coder, the gs delegate and the Ghostscript coders.

With Disk storage, rotate secret_key_base and every secret the app process can read. Do not keep an old secret as a fallback.

How to tell if you were hit

Review recent uploads for files that are not valid images or that contain ImageMagick scripting content, such as MSL or @filename references. Check the application and ImageMagick logs for errors from identify or convert around attach time. Look for unexpected new files on the app host, especially in web-served or code paths. If you stored attachments on Disk and ran an affected version with untrusted uploads, assume secrets were readable and rotate them.

Original advisory

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Impact

A Rails application that processes attachments with ImageMagick may allow an unauthenticated attacker to write arbitrary files on the server and, when attachments are stored with the Disk service, to read arbitrary files readable by the application process. Those files typically include secret_key_base and credentials for external systems, which may in turn allow escalation to remote code execution or lateral movement to those systems.

Details

ImageMagick selects a coder from the content of the file it is given, and some coders act on files named inside the image rather than on the image itself. Active Storage constrained none of ImageMagick's coders, and the ImageMagick analyzer runs when a file is attached, so an attacker who can upload a crafted file may be able to invoke one. Attaching the upload is sufficient; no variant, preview, or analyze call is required. One specific attack chain has been reported to us, but we do not assume it is the only one that exists.

The fixed versions ship an ImageMagick security policy and prepend its directory to MAGICK_CONFIGURE_PATH through MiniMagick.cli_env, so every ImageMagick process that MiniMagick spawns applies it. The policy denies the MSL scripting coder, the coders that read or delete files other than the image, fetch remote or local references, or display to a screen, every coder backed by Ghostscript together with the gs delegate, and @filename indirection. ImageMagick applies every policy.xml on its search path, so the shipped policy adds to the host's policy rather than replacing it. The policy applies to every ImageMagick command that MiniMagick runs, not only those of Active Storage. See the activestorage CHANGELOG and "ImageMagick Security Policy" in the Active Storage guide.

Affected applications

An application is affected if it meets all of these requirements:

  • Uses ImageMagick for Active Storage image processing. This is config.active_storage.variant_processor = :mini_magick, which is the default for applications on load_defaults 6.1 or earlier.
  • Runs ImageMagick under a security policy that does not already deny the coders involved. The policies that Debian and Ubuntu package do not.
  • Allows file uploads from untrusted users.

Mitigation

  • Upgrade to a fixed version of activestorage.
  • An application whose variant processor is :mini_magick must use mini_magick >= 5.1, which applying the policy requires. With an older mini_magick, such an application raises an exception during boot.
  • An application that renders PostScript or PDF through ImageMagick must re-allow the gs delegate and the coders it uses in the host's policy.xml.
  • An application that replaces MiniMagick.cli_env after boot, clears the environment with MiniMagick.cli_prefix, or installs its own MiniMagick::Shell does not receive the shipped policy and must carry its rules in ImageMagick's system policy. GraphicsMagick does not read ImageMagick policies.
  • If attachments are stored with the Disk service, change secret_key_base and every secret readable by the application process, including the master key and everything config/credentials.yml.enc holds, storage and database credentials, and third-party tokens. Do not retain an exposed secret as a fallback.

Workarounds

Copy the rules of the policy that the fixed versions ship, activestorage/lib/active_storage/image_magick/policy.xml, into ImageMagick's system policy, for example /etc/ImageMagick-7/policy.xml. At a minimum, deny the MSL coder, the Ghostscript coders, and the gs delegate:

<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="MSL"/>
<policy domain="delegate" rights="none" pattern="gs"/>
<policy domain="coder" rights="none" pattern="{PS,PS2,PS3,EPS,EPS2,EPS3,EPI,EPSF,EPSI,EPT,EPT2,EPT3,PDF,AI,EPDF,PDFA,POCKETMOD,XPS,PCL}"/>

Releases

The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

Patches for those who cannot upgrade at once:

  • 8.1: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/468aa9a93fc98f5476b6821770f4ccfcb7f7d328
  • 8.0: https://github.com/rails/rails/commit/ea8c40121ce53a3d0255cd4eb6d13bfe3bc01776

Versions affected

  • activestorage < 8.0.5.2
  • activestorage >= 8.1, < 8.1.4.1

Credit

This issue was responsibly reported by HackerOne researcher ryotak.

References

Credited to Ry0taK.

Questions

Does an attacker need to be logged in?

No. The advisory describes an unauthenticated attacker. It is enough that the app lets untrusted users upload a file that gets attached.

Am I safe if I use the vips processor?

The advisory applies only to apps using ImageMagick through :mini_magick. It lists that setting as the first requirement for being affected.

Which versions fix CVE-2026-122006?

activestorage 8.0.5.2 and 8.1.4.1. Versions before 8.0.5.2, and 8.1.0.beta1 up to before 8.1.4.1, are vulnerable.

Do I need to rotate secrets after upgrading?

Yes, if you used the Disk service and untrusted uploads before patching. Rotate secret_key_base, the master key, credentials and third-party tokens.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. The analysis is written by an AI model from the sources listed above and checked by automated rules before it is published. Check versions against the vendor's advisory before you act. Methodology

Coverage on the Beam blog

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