CVE-2026-130007: k8s-mcp-server: Missing authentication on default SSE/HTTP transport allows unauthenticated Kubernetes tool execution
Summary When k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP tools/call endpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check. Any client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the server's Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials, executing with the server's configured cluster privileges.
Published Nov 19, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- < 1.1.0
- Fixed in
- 1.1.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
When k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP tools/call endpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check. Any client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the server's Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials, executing with the server's configured cluster privileges.
Affected
Commit be87a6dd72bb6ec1d4886b8548843b99a4638b12 (Merge PR #130) MCP library: github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go v0.57.0 Default mode: sse (SERVER_MODE default), default port 8080, bind 0.0.0.0
Root cause (static trace: handleSSE -> handleMessage -> tools/call)
- main.go L129:
server.NewSSEServer(s)is created with no auth option and no contextFunc; L130sse.Start(":"+port)binds all interfaces (0.0.0.0). - mcp-go sse.go handleSSE (GET /sse): no auth header check; the server mints a sessionId for any caller. The sessionId is a correlation value, not a credential.
- handleMessage (POST /message): the only gates are method==POST and a loadable sessionId. No Authorization/Bearer/token/Origin/CSRF check before
s.server.HandleMessage(ctx, rawMessage)dispatches to the tools/call handler. - Only
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *is present (CORS relaxation, not auth).
Write tools (Create/Delete/RolloutRestart, Helm Install/Upgrade/Uninstall/Rollback) are all registered unless -read-only is set (default readOnly=false).
Runtime reproduction (no auth headers on any request)
Started: k8s-mcp-server -mode sse -port 8080 with a dummy non-routable KUBERNETES_SERVER=https://127.0.0.1:1 (no real cluster touched).
GET /sse -> HTTP 200; server mints /message?sessionId=93b3... POST /message initialize -> HTTP 202; result returned over SSE POST /message tools/list -> HTTP 202; FULL tool list returned (incl. destructive) POST /message tools/call getAPIResources -> HTTP 202; handler EXECUTED: error -32603 "... Get https://127.0.0.1:1/api...: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect"
The tools/call response is NOT HTTP 401/403 but an in-handler cluster-connection error, proving the RPC passed any authorization gate and reached the getAPIResources handler. With a valid kubeconfig, the same path returns real cluster data. ss -ltnp confirms LISTEN *:8080 (all interfaces, externally exposed).
Impact
An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the port can enumerate tools and invoke Kubernetes operations with the server's privileges — cluster read and, with default readOnly=false, state-changing operations (Create/Delete/Helm). CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).
Why this is a defect, not by-design
Default mode is HTTP (sse) on 0.0.0.0:8080, containerized deployment is the normal scenario, and there is no "trusted client only" / auth-required note in the docs. MCP HTTP transports are expected to be loopback-only or gated; this one is neither.
Suggested fix
- Add an authorization gate before tools/call on the HTTP transports: e.g. WithSSEContextFunc to validate an Authorization bearer/token, or fail-closed when no token is configured in HTTP mode.
- Default the bind to 127.0.0.1 and require explicit opt-in for external binding.
- Document that HTTP mode must sit behind an authenticating proxy; recommend STDIO by default.
Reproduction was done against the actual built binary and the shipped SSE path (not an extract).
Credit
bebold6133
Credited to bebold6133.
References
- https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-m932-63jc-4jqq
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-130007
- https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/issues/131
- https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/pull/134
- https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/commit/817d81005369837e0c034962785851ca4dec9a76
- https://github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server/releases/tag/v1.1.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-m932-63jc-4jqq
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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