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CVE-2026-130007: k8s-mcp-server: Missing authentication on default SSE/HTTP transport allows unauthenticated Kubernetes tool execution

highCVSS 4.0 7.9GHSA-m932-63jc-4jqq

Summary When k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP tools/call endpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check. Any client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the server's Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials, executing with the server's configured cluster privileges.

Published Nov 19, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 1.1.0
Fixed in
1.1.0
Check
go list -m github.com/reza-gholizade/k8s-mcp-server

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

When k8s-mcp-server runs in its default SSE transport mode, the MCP tools/call endpoint is dispatched with no authentication, session token, or Origin check. Any client that can reach the listening port can enumerate and invoke the server's Kubernetes tools (including destructive/write tools) without credentials, executing with the server's configured cluster privileges.

Affected

Commit be87a6dd72bb6ec1d4886b8548843b99a4638b12 (Merge PR #130) MCP library: github.com/mark3labs/mcp-go v0.57.0 Default mode: sse (SERVER_MODE default), default port 8080, bind 0.0.0.0

Root cause (static trace: handleSSE -> handleMessage -> tools/call)

  • main.go L129: server.NewSSEServer(s) is created with no auth option and no contextFunc; L130 sse.Start(":"+port) binds all interfaces (0.0.0.0).
  • mcp-go sse.go handleSSE (GET /sse): no auth header check; the server mints a sessionId for any caller. The sessionId is a correlation value, not a credential.
  • handleMessage (POST /message): the only gates are method==POST and a loadable sessionId. No Authorization/Bearer/token/Origin/CSRF check before s.server.HandleMessage(ctx, rawMessage) dispatches to the tools/call handler.
  • Only Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * is present (CORS relaxation, not auth).

Write tools (Create/Delete/RolloutRestart, Helm Install/Upgrade/Uninstall/Rollback) are all registered unless -read-only is set (default readOnly=false).

Runtime reproduction (no auth headers on any request)

Started: k8s-mcp-server -mode sse -port 8080 with a dummy non-routable KUBERNETES_SERVER=https://127.0.0.1:1 (no real cluster touched).

GET /sse -> HTTP 200; server mints /message?sessionId=93b3... POST /message initialize -> HTTP 202; result returned over SSE POST /message tools/list -> HTTP 202; FULL tool list returned (incl. destructive) POST /message tools/call getAPIResources -> HTTP 202; handler EXECUTED: error -32603 "... Get https://127.0.0.1:1/api...: dial tcp 127.0.0.1:1: connect"

The tools/call response is NOT HTTP 401/403 but an in-handler cluster-connection error, proving the RPC passed any authorization gate and reached the getAPIResources handler. With a valid kubeconfig, the same path returns real cluster data. ss -ltnp confirms LISTEN *:8080 (all interfaces, externally exposed).

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker with network reach to the port can enumerate tools and invoke Kubernetes operations with the server's privileges — cluster read and, with default readOnly=false, state-changing operations (Create/Delete/Helm). CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function).

Why this is a defect, not by-design

Default mode is HTTP (sse) on 0.0.0.0:8080, containerized deployment is the normal scenario, and there is no "trusted client only" / auth-required note in the docs. MCP HTTP transports are expected to be loopback-only or gated; this one is neither.

Suggested fix

  • Add an authorization gate before tools/call on the HTTP transports: e.g. WithSSEContextFunc to validate an Authorization bearer/token, or fail-closed when no token is configured in HTTP mode.
  • Default the bind to 127.0.0.1 and require explicit opt-in for external binding.
  • Document that HTTP mode must sit behind an authenticating proxy; recommend STDIO by default.

Reproduction was done against the actual built binary and the shipped SSE path (not an extract).

Credit

bebold6133

Credited to bebold6133.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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