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CVE-2026-130008: sqlite-mcp: Read-only mode bypass via statement chaining and SQL injection in describe_table

highCVSS 3.1 8.2GHSA-q433-mp6c-8v4f

Summary In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through executequery, and SQL injection through describetable. Details - Statement chaining in executequery.

Published Nov 19, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 0.1.2
Fixed in
0.1.2
Check
go list -m github.com/StacklokLabs/sqlite-mcp

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

In read-only mode (the default), a client that can call the MCP tools can write to the database the server is meant to expose read-only, read other SQLite files, and create new SQLite files anywhere the server process can write. There are two ways in: statement chaining through execute_query, and SQL injection through describe_table.

Details

  • Statement chaining in `execute_query`. The only check was that the query starts with SELECT. The modernc.org/sqlite driver runs every ;-separated statement in one call, so anything after SELECT 1; ran unchecked.
  • SQL injection in `describe_table`. The table_name argument was interpolated into PRAGMA table_info(%s) with no guard.
  • Escaping read-only mode. Through either path, ATTACH DATABASE opens a file read-write regardless of the main connection's mode=ro. Attaching the protected database itself made it writable. Attaching another path read that file, or created it if it did not exist.

Read-write mode is not affected beyond its intended capabilities, apart from ATTACH reaching files other than the configured database.

Impact

  • Modify the database that read-only mode is meant to protect.
  • Read any SQLite database file the server process can read.
  • Create new SQLite-format files anywhere the server process can write, or write to existing SQLite or empty files. Existing non-empty files that are not SQLite databases are refused and left unchanged.

The server has no built-in authentication and, by default, listens on :8080 on all interfaces. Unless it is deployed behind an authenticating proxy, anyone who can reach that port can exploit this.

Patches

Fixed in v0.1.2:

  • ATTACH is disabled in the engine (SQLITE_LIMIT_ATTACHED set to 0) on every connection that runs a statement.
  • Read-only connections set query_only.
  • execute_query rejects input that contains more than one statement.
  • describe_table passes the table name as a bound parameter.

Workarounds

Upgrade to v0.1.2. If you cannot upgrade, don't expose the server to untrusted clients: keep it on a loopback or private interface, or run it behind an authenticating proxy such as ToolHive. Mount only the database you intend to expose, read-only at the filesystem or container level.

Credits

Reported by @bebold6133.

Credited to bebold6133.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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