CVE-2026-25525: OpenMage LTS has a Path Traversal Filter Bypass in Dataflow Module
The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (strreplace('../', '', $input)) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like ..././ or ....//, which after the replacement still result in ../. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.
Published Apr 21, 2026
Affected packages
openmage/magento-lts
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- < 20.17.0
- Fixed in
- 20.17.0
- Check
composer show openmage/magento-lts
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
The Dataflow module in OpenMage LTS uses a weak blacklist filter (str_replace('../', '', $input)) to prevent path traversal attacks. This filter can be bypassed using patterns like ..././ or ....//, which after the replacement still result in ../. An authenticated administrator can exploit this to read arbitrary files from the server filesystem.
| Metric | Value | Justification | | Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable via admin panel | | Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | Simple bypass pattern | | Privileges Required (PR) | High | Requires admin authentication | | User Interaction (UI) | None | No additional user interaction needed | | Scope (S) | Unchanged | Impacts the vulnerable component | | Confidentiality (C) | High | Can read sensitive system files | | Integrity (I) | None | Read-only vulnerability | | Availability (A) | None | No impact on availability |
Affected Products
- OpenMage LTS versions < 20.16.1
- All versions derived from Magento 1.x with these code paths
Affected Files
| File | Line | Vulnerable Code |
| `app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Csv.php` | 67 | `str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...))` |
| `app/code/core/Mage/Dataflow/Model/Convert/Parser/Xml/Excel.php` | 63 | `str_replace('../', '', urldecode(...))` |Vulnerability Details
The Dataflow module allows administrators to import data from files. The files parameter specifies which file to import from the var/import/ directory. To prevent path traversal, the code uses str_replace() to remove ../ sequences:
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));However, str_replace() only performs a single pass, making it trivially bypassable:
Bypass Examples
| Input | After `str_replace('../', '', ...)` | Result |
| `..././` | `../` | Bypass |
| `....//` | `../` | Bypass |
| `..././..././..././etc/passwd` | `../../../etc/passwd` | File read |Attack Scenario
- Attacker gains admin access (via compromised credentials, social engineering, etc.)
- Navigate to System > Import/Export > Dataflow Profiles
- Create or modify an import profile
- Set the
filesparameter to:..././..././..././etc/passwd - Run the profile to read the contents of
/etc/passwd
Proof of Concept
# Request to Dataflow with bypass pattern
GET /admin/system_convert_gui/run/id/1/?files=..././..././..././etc/passwd
# The str_replace removes '../' leaving:
# ..././..././..././etc/passwd -> ../../../etc/passwd
# Final path resolves to:
# /var/www/html/var/import/../../../etc/passwd -> /etc/passwdRemediation
Replace the weak str_replace() filter with basename() to extract only the filename:
// Before (vulnerable)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. str_replace('../', '', urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));
// After (fixed)
$file = Mage::app()->getConfig()->getTempVarDir() . '/import/'
. basename(urldecode(Mage::app()->getRequest()->getParam('files')));Using basename() ensures only the filename portion is used, completely preventing any path traversal regardless of the input pattern.
Workarounds
If immediate upgrade is not possible:
- Restrict admin access: Limit Dataflow access to trusted administrators only
- Disable Dataflow: If not in use, disable the Dataflow module entirely
- Web Application Firewall: Block requests containing path traversal patterns
- File permissions: Ensure the web server user has minimal filesystem permissions
- Monitor admin activity: Alert on suspicious Dataflow profile execution
Impact
An attacker with admin access can read sensitive files including:
/etc/passwd- System user informationapp/etc/local.xml- Database credentials.envfiles - Environment secrets- Log files - Potentially sensitive application data
- Configuration files - Server and application configuration
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by blackhat2013 through HackerOne.
Timeline
- 2025-12-31: Vulnerability reported via HackerOne
- 2026-01-21: Fix developed and tested
References
- https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/security/advisories/GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-25525
- https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/pull/5445
- https://hackerone.com/reports/3482926
- https://github.com/OpenMage/magento-lts/releases/tag/v20.17.0
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6vqf-6fhm-7rc6
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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