CVE-2026-42207: Magento LTS Vulnerable to Open Redirect via Unvalidated `uenc` Parameter in `stockAction()`
Summary MageProductAlertAddController::stockAction() reads the uenc query parameter and passes it directly to $this-redirectUrl($backUrl) without calling $this-isUrlInternal() When the supplied productid does not match any catalog product, the server issues an unvalidated HTTP 302 redirect to whatever URL was provided as uenc.
Published May 5, 2026 · Updated May 15, 2026
Affected packages
openmage/magento-lts
- Ecosystem
- Composer (PHP)
- Affected
- <= 20.17.0
- Fixed in
- 20.18.0
- Check
composer show openmage/magento-lts
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
Mage_ProductAlert_AddController::stockAction() reads the uenc query parameter and passes it directly to $this->_redirectUrl($backUrl) without calling $this->_isUrlInternal() When the supplied product_id does not match any catalog product, the server issues an unvalidated HTTP 302 redirect to whatever URL was provided as uenc.
Vulnerable path:
// app/code/core/Mage/ProductAlert/controllers/AddController.php : stockAction()
$backUrl = $this->getRequest()->getParam(Mage_Core_Controller_Front_Action::PARAM_NAME_URL_ENCODED); // raw, no decode
$productId = (int) $this->getRequest()->getParam('product_id');
if (!$backUrl || !$productId) {
$this->_redirect('/');
return;
}
$product = Mage::getModel('catalog/product')->load($productId);
if (!$product->getId()) {
$session->addError($this->__('Not enough parameters.'));
$this->_redirectUrl($backUrl); // ← NO _isUrlInternal() check
return;
}Secure peer (priceAction()):
if (!$product->getId()) {
if ($this->_isUrlInternal($backUrl)) { // ← validation present
$this->_redirectUrl($backUrl);
} else {
$this->_redirect('/');
}
return;
}Steps to Reproduce
Prerequisites
- OpenMage LTS ≤ 20.16.0 with Product Alerts enabled (default configuration)
- A valid, logged-in customer session on the target store
Step 1 – Authenticate as a Customer (Attacker controls the crafted link; victim must be logged in)
The preDispatch() hook calls Mage::getSingleton('customer/session')->authenticate($this). If the request comes from an unauthenticated user, they are redirected to the login page first. The open redirect only fires after the customer is authenticated. This is the realistic attack scenario: the attacker sends a crafted link to a customer who is already logged in.
Step 2 – Craft the Malicious URL
The uenc parameter is read raw via getParam() with no base64 decoding in this code path. A plain URL is sufficient and produces the redirect:
GET /productalert/add/stock/?product_id=99999&uenc=https://evil.com/steal-credentials HTTP/1.1
Host: <store-hostname>
Cookie: om_frontend=<authenticated-session>Key conditions:
product_idmust reference a non-existent product (triggers the vulnerable branch; any large ID works)uencis the raw destination URL (no base64 encoding required)
Impact
Technical Impact
An attacker who controls the uenc parameter value can redirect any logged-in shopper to an arbitrary external URL. Because the redirect originates from the legitimate store domain, the victim’s browser shows the trusted store URL in the address bar momentarily before being sent to the attacker site. The HTTP 302 response exits the store’s origin before the browser shows anything to the user.
Business-Level Attack Vectors
| Scenario | Description | | Credential phishing | Craft a link claiming to show a stock notification. Customer lands on attacker’s login clone and reuses their password. | | OAuth / SSO token theft| If the store uses a social login or “Login with Google” flow, the attacker can inject their redirect_uri via the open redirect, stealing OAuth tokens. | | Affiliate fraud | Redirect customers from the legitimate store to a competing retailer after they click a “notify me” link. | | Malware distribution | Redirect to drive-by-download pages with the store’s reputation acting as social proof. |
Propagation
A single malicious link can be embedded in:
- Customer emails (“Click here for stock notification preferences”)
- Forum posts, social media, or product reviews on the store
- SEO-poisoned search results that rank the store’s domain
Recommended Fix
Apply the same _isUrlInternal() guard used in priceAction() to the stockAction() missing-product
This is an AI-generated report.
An attempt was made to test the same PoC against the online demo https://demo.openmage.org/ but it couldn't be reproduced. It was only reproduced against the local setup env against the latest version.
Credited to 0x0OZ.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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