CVE-2026-25899: Fiber is Vulnerable to Denial of Service via Flash Cookie Unbounded Allocation
Summary The use of the fiberflash cookie can force an unbounded allocation on any server. A crafted 10-character cookie value triggers an attempt to allocate up to 85GB of memory via unvalidated msgpack deserialization. No authentication is required. Every GoFiber v3 endpoint is affected regardless of whether the application uses flash messages.
Published Feb 24, 2026 · Updated Feb 27, 2026
Affected packages
github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3
- Ecosystem
- Go
- Affected
- <= 3.0.0
- Fixed in
- 3.1.0
- Check
go list -m github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3
Advisory details
From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).
Summary
The use of the fiber_flash cookie can force an unbounded allocation on any server. A crafted 10-character cookie value triggers an attempt to allocate up to 85GB of memory via unvalidated msgpack deserialization. No authentication is required. Every GoFiber v3 endpoint is affected regardless of whether the application uses flash messages.
Details
Regardless of configuration, the flash cookie is checked:
func (app *App) requestHandler(rctx *fasthttp.RequestCtx) {
// Acquire context from the pool
ctx := app.AcquireCtx(rctx)
defer app.ReleaseCtx(ctx)
// Optional: Check flash messages
rawHeaders := d.Request().Header.RawHeaders()
if len(rawHeaders) > 0 && bytes.Contains(rawHeaders, flashCookieNameBytes) {
d.Redirect().parseAndClearFlashMessages()
}
_, err = app.next(d)
} else {
// Check if the HTTP method is valid
if ctx.getMethodInt() == -1 {
_ = ctx.SendStatus(StatusNotImplemented) //nolint:errcheck // Always return nil
return
}
// Optional: Check flash messages
rawHeaders := ctx.Request().Header.RawHeaders()
if len(rawHeaders) > 0 && bytes.Contains(rawHeaders, flashCookieNameBytes) {
ctx.Redirect().parseAndClearFlashMessages()
}
}The cookie value is hex-decoded and passed directly to msgpack deserialization with no size or content validation:
https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/f8f34f642fb3682c341ede7816e7cf861aa7df89/redirect.go#L371
// parseAndClearFlashMessages is a method to get flash messages before they are getting removed
func (r *Redirect) parseAndClearFlashMessages() {
// parse flash messages
cookieValue, err := hex.DecodeString(r.c.Cookies(FlashCookieName))
if err != nil {
return
}
_, err = r.c.flashMessages.UnmarshalMsg(cookieValue)
if err != nil {
return
}
r.c.Cookie(&Cookie{
Name: FlashCookieName,
Value: "",
Path: "/",
MaxAge: -1,
})
}The auto-generated tinylib/msgp deserialization reads a uint32 array header from the attacker-controlled byte stream and passes it directly to make() with no bounds check:
https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/blob/f8f34f642fb3682c341ede7816e7cf861aa7df89/redirect_msgp.go#L242
// UnmarshalMsg implements msgp.Unmarshaler
func (z *redirectionMsgs) UnmarshalMsg(bts []byte) (o []byte, err error) {
var zb0002 uint32
zb0002, bts, err = msgp.ReadArrayHeaderBytes(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err)
return o, err
}
if cap((*z)) >= int(zb0002) {
(*z) = (*z)[:zb0002]
} else {
(*z) = make(redirectionMsgs, zb0002)
}
for zb0001 := range *z {
bts, err = (*z)[zb0001].UnmarshalMsg(bts)
if err != nil {
err = msgp.WrapError(err, zb0001)
return o, err
}
}
o = bts
return o, err
}where zb0002, bts, err = msgp.ReadArrayHeaderBytes(bts) translates the attacker-controlled value into the element count and make(redirectionMsgs, zb0002) performs the unbounded allocation
So we can craft a gofiber cookie that will force a huge allocation: curl -H "Cookie: fiber_flash=dd7fffffff" http://localhost:5000/hello
The cookie val is a hex-encoded msgpack array32 header:
dd= msgpack array32 marker7fffffff= 2 147 483 647 elements
Impact
Unauthenticated remote Denial of Service (CWE-789). Anyone running a gofiber v3.0.0 or v3 server is affected. The flash cookie parsing is hardcoded.
Credited to tuliperis, gaby.
References
How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology
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