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Open-source package vulnerability · Go

CVE-2026-26308: Envoy has RBAC Header Validation Bypass via Multi-Value Header Concatenation

highCVSS 3.1 7.5GHSA-ghc4-35x6-crw5

1. Summary The Envoy RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) filter contains a logic vulnerability in how it validates HTTP headers when multiple values are present for the same header name. Instead of validating each header value individually, Envoy concatenates all values into a single comma-separated string.

Published Mar 10, 2026 · Updated Apr 13, 2026

Affected packages

github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
= 1.37.0
Fixed in
1.37.1
Check
go list -m github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.36.0, <= 1.36.4
Fixed in
1.36.5
Check
go list -m github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
>= 1.35.0, <= 1.35.8
Fixed in
1.35.9
Check
go list -m github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Ecosystem
Go
Affected
<= 1.34.12
Fixed in
1.34.13
Check
go list -m github.com/envoyproxy/envoy

Advisory details

From the GitHub Advisory Database (CC BY 4.0).

1. Summary

The Envoy RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) filter contains a logic vulnerability in how it validates HTTP headers when multiple values are present for the same header name. Instead of validating each header value individually, Envoy concatenates all values into a single comma-separated string. This behavior allows attackers to bypass RBAC policies—specifically "Deny" rules—by sending duplicate headers, effectively obscuring the malicious value from exact-match mechanisms.

2. Attack Scenario

Consider an environment where an administrator wants to block external access to internal resources using a specific header flag.

Configuration

The Envoy proxy is configured with a Deny rule to reject requests containing the header internal: true.

  • Rule Type: Exact Match
  • Target: internal header must not equal true.

The Bypass Logic

  1. Standard Request (Blocked):
  2. Input: internal: true
  3. Envoy Processing: Sees string "true".
  4. Result: Match found. Request Denied.
  1. Exploit Request (Bypassed):
  2. Input: ``http internal: true internal: true ``
  3. Envoy Processing: Concatenates values into "true,true".
  4. Matcher Evaluation: Does "true,true" equal "true"? No.
  5. Result: The Deny rule fails to trigger. Request Allowed.

3. Implications

  • RBAC Bypass: Remote attackers can bypass configured access controls.
  • Unauthorized Access: Sensitive internal resources or administrative endpoints protected by header-based Deny rules become accessible.
  • Risk: High, particularly for deployments relying on "Exact Match" strategies for security blocking.

4. Reproduction Steps

To verify this vulnerability:

  1. Deploy Envoy: Configure an instance with an RBAC Deny rule that performs an exact match on a specific header (e.g., internal: true).
  2. Baseline Test: Send a request containing the header internal: true.
  3. *Observation:* Envoy blocks this request (HTTP 403).
  4. Exploit Test: Send a second request containing the same header twice: ``http GET /restricted-resource HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com internal: true internal: true ``
  5. *Observation:* Envoy allows the request, granting access to the resource.

6. Recommendations

Fix Header Validation Logic: Modify the RBAC filter to validate each header value instance individually. Avoid relying on the concatenated string output of getAllOfHeaderAsString() for security-critical matching unless the matcher is explicitly designed to parse comma-separated lists.

** Examine the DENY role to use a Regex style fix.

Credit: Dor Konis

Credited to botengyao, phlax, agrawroh, sekveaja.

References

How this page is made: the data panel comes from the GitHub Advisory Database, CISA’s KEV catalog, the NVD and FIRST EPSS, and updates twice a day. No analysis has been written for this entry yet. Methodology

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